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THE CONSITERATION GP :THS YALTA CONFERENCE
AS AN EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT

:

The story of the Yalta Conference is a complex and a difficult
one.

The Yalta Conference was one of a series of important conferences

which were held among the Allies during the Second World War,

Yalta

was also the second, and the last, meeting between President Roosevelt,
Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin in a face-to-face situation.
The Axis powers of Hitler and Mussolini along with the Empire of
Japan had been conducting a ravaging war with the Allies in many areas
of the world.

At Yalta, when the defeat of the European belligerents

was in sight, the Big

had a two-fold task.

On© task involved

the establishment of the foundations of peace, hopefully a lasting
peace, and the second was designed to put Europe back together again,
geographically and politically.
To this date, there has been no single formal conference to
determine a peace treaty after World Wax II, but a series of confer
ences from the signing of the Atlantic Charter to the Potsdam Confer
ence mark the way,

Yalta was the most important, for it was there that

Franklin D, Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin established
the Allied plans for the final military victory and agreed on the par
titioning of Germany and on certain plans for future peace.
Not only was the Yalta Conference the most important Allied
conference held during the war, but it also became the most controversial.
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Those who criticise and analyse this conference seem to fall into
three categories.

First there are those who show a lack of under

standing of American objectives in the conduct of the war and in
America’s efforts during the war to lay a foundation for a peaceful
post-war era.

Secondly, there are those who, for reasons best known

to themselves, have distorted and perverted the facts to a point at
which their statements have little or no basis in reality.

The

third category consists of those who, in a scholarly and-objective
manner, try to establish the truth about the Yalta Conference,
Probably the most troublesome problem one encounters when dealing
with the Yalta Conference is that there are very few critics in the
third category.

Much of the writing dealing with Yalta is presented

in a biased or prejudiced manner,

It is the historian’s task to

discover the truth, and that task becomes a difficult one when the
subject is as emotional, complex, and controversial as the Yalta
Conference,
When studying the Yalta Conference and its relation to United
States foreign policy, a topic of major concern is Franklin D, Roose
velt’s role,

Throughout Roosevelt’s four presidential administrations,

he assumed a tremendous amount of political power.

With his election

to the presidency in 1932, Roosevelt was confronted with one of the
worst problems the United States has ever faced, the Great Depression,
President Roosevelt did not hesitate to meet the emergency! he operated
on the United States’ economy much as a surgeon operates on a cancerous
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body.

During 'the New Deal era* Roosevelt became accustomed to

wielding the power with which his high office was endowed,

Presi~

dent Roosevelt, in collaboration with his companions in the "Brain
Trust," was to become the innovator of numerous federal agencies
with the purposes of relief, reform and recovery.

When an act was

proved unconstitutional, a new one was often created to replace the
discarded one, as when the National Industrial Recovery Act Section
7a was replaced by the Wagner Act or the first and second Agricul
tural Adjustment Act.

The American populace became used to the

"fireside chats" in which Resident Roosevelt explained the new
programs that the Federal government would be unfolding.

In fact,

the Federal government began delving into areas that were regarded
as being "off limits," the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Works
Progress Administration and the National Industrial Recovery Act
being prime examples,

Resident Roosevelt*s use of his executive

power and his power*s influence was clearly seen in the 1937 "courtpacking" attempt and the 1938 purge of the Democratic Party’s Congres^r^a and Senators who opposed President Roosevelt and the New
Deal,
The source of much of the criticism of the New Deal lies in
the Federal government's increasing role on the domestic scene.

The

government became an employment agency, an electric power company,
an old-age insurance company, and a referee for commercial interests.
President Roosevelt, as the head of the executive branch, was accused

4

of becoming a dictator and some compared his influence with the
increasing power of Germany*s Adolf Hitler arid Italy’s Benito Musso
lini,
The purpose of this study is to show that with the emergence
of'World wax II and throughout the war itself, President Roosevelt
increased the use of his executive powers and in particular expanded
the uses of the executive agreement*

The executive agreement, given

to the president in his role as the United States* chief diplomat,
was used by President Roosevelt from the time of the Fifty Destroyers
Deal through the Yalta Conference.

Justice Sutherland in 1936 gave

the Supreme Court’s approval "on the very delicate, plenary and
exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the government
in the field of international relations."*

The use of the executive

agreement will be traced through the major military and militarypolitical conferences held during the Second World War that finally
cumulated at Yalta in February of 1945»
The first major military-political conference in which President
Roosevelt participated was the meeting with Prime Minister Winston
Churchill,

Ihat resulted in the Atlantic Charter.

In August of

1941, the two leaders met off the coast of Newfoundland in a confer
ence that was kept secret due to the threat of German submarines.

The

three chief topics to be discussed were lend-lease, common defense, and
*United States v, Curtiss Wright Corporation, L99» U. S. 304
(1936)« 819,

5

a joint policy against Japan concerning her aggression in the Fax
East®

The so-called Atlantic Charter was the result of a press

release issued by the two statesmen that set forth their aims for
a post-war peace.

The common principles of the Charter created by

the United States and Great Britain were!

(i) neither country would

seek any aggrandisement, territorial or otherwise; (2 ) no terri
torial changes would occur without the expressed wishes of the
people involved ; (3) both countries would respect the right of all
peoples to choose the form of government under which they would live}
(4) they would endeavor to trade with the whole world for materials
which axe needed for economic prosperity? (5) they would give the
fullest collaboration with all nations in the economic field} (6)
after the destruction of the Nasi philosophy and rule, they hoped
for an established peace; (7) this peace should allow men to travel
•foe high seas and oceans freely 1 and (8) all nations must abandon the
use of fore© and crush the burden of armaments.

The Atlantic Charter

can be called the Fourteen Points of toe Second World War, for it
also established the post-war goal for peace and security which was
backed by the heads of the two most powerful nations in the world.
The Charter is also significant in that it planted the seed for the
establishment of the United Nations,
This action by President Roosevelt was a major step in his
policy of limited co-belligerency prior to the United States' total
involvement.

The United States was forming a war and post-war policy
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with an active belligerent nation even though America was not
involved.

In essence, the Atlantic Charter was an implied promise

of future American belligerence.

Considering the circumstances,

this policy was not in accordance with the spirit of the neutrality
laws of the 19309s.

President Roosevelt’s famous “Quarantine Speech”

in Chicago, 1937, and his 19^1 "Four Freedoms" laid the groundwork
for the Atlantic Charter.

The United States was in a transitional

state between being a seemingly neutral nation and becoming an
active belligerent.

The United States, by the Atlantic Charter, was

involved in an Anglo-American proposal designed to exercise leader
ship in policing the world both during and after the war.

America

accepted the responsibility for the defeat of Germany when Roosevelt
announced that ” . . . after the final destruction of Nazi tyranny,
they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations
the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, , ,

2

The spirit of the Atlantic Charter is quite evident in later
conferences involving the United States' role in the war, including
Yalta,

This monumental meeting in the North Atlantic was not destined

to become a formal treaty, nor a signed document, nor even an official
state paper.

It was an executive agreement issued by President Roose

velt, and its only legal position was a carefully phrased press release.
The Atlantic Charter was not the first and not to be the last time

2
Samuel Rosenman, ed,, The Public Papers of Address of Franklin
D. Roosevelt (New Yorks Harper and Brothers, 1950jr" P* 3*5»
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President Roosevelt initiated United States foreign policy without
the 'consent of Congress•
The importance of the Atlantic Charter m s soon realised in
another executive agreement made by President Roosevelt, the Declaration of the United Nations.

Two weeks after the Japanese attack on

Pearl Harbor, Prime Minister Winston Churchill travelled to Washington
and met with President Roosevelt in conjunction with other c©“belliger
ents . The result was a document, dated January i, 19^2, signed by
twenty-six nations currently at war with the Axis powers.

The

Declaration of the United Nations was pledged to the principles set
forth by the Atlantic Charter, and the participants agreed not to
sign separate peaces, and declared their unity against a common enemy.
This executive agreement became a binding military alliance.
The next important conference held during the war was the Casa
blanca Conference.

This meeting, like the Atlantic Charter, was held

solely between the United States and Britain,

From January I k to the

2k of 19^3, Churchill and Roosevelt met with the purpose of discussing

the opening of the Mediterranean to Allied commerce, thereby saving a
twelve-thousand-mile trip around the Cape of Good Hope, and regaining
a foothold on the European Gontinent which would hopefully lead to
the eventual assault upon the Reich itself.

This was against the hopes

of Stalin, who wanted to establish a second Allied front in Europe to
relieve the pressure on Russia,

The United States and Great Britain

decided to invade Sicily; but, at the conference, Resident Roosevelt
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mentioned a policy which overshadowed our policy toward the Axis and
their satellites.

This policy was the on© of "unconditional surrender,"

It was not formed by the State Department, but was revealed in a dis
cussion in the presence of Prime Minister Churchill,

The President

quickly qualified his statement by saying that unconditional surrender
meant H # #

. the^ ending of a philosophy based on the conquest and sub

jugation of
3
and Italy.

other peoples," not the total
This policy of unconditional

one of the important topics of discussion

destruction of Germany,Japan
surrender turned out tobe
at later conferences,

including Yalta,
Thus, the Casablanca Conference advanced another important step
in outlining American foreign policy in the realm of the allied opera
tions during the war#

President Roosevelt bound the United States by

the use of the executive agreement, for he rationalized that this con
ference contained top secret planning that would lose its effective
ness if it were made public.

Therefore, the agreements made at Casa-

blanea did not go before Congress.

lL

light months after the Casablanca Conference, there was a note
worthy conference held in Moscow,

The Moscow Conference, which ran

from October 19 to 30, 1943, was a meeting attended by the United
States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China,

President Roosevelt

^Cordell Hull, Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York*
Company, 1948), p. 1570.
4

Macmillan

Samuel Flagg Bends, Diplomatic History of the United States
(New York? Holt and CompsnyJ^l^STT^P* ^90.
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m s certain that World War II would lead to some type of an inter
national security system directed toward avoiding further world wars.
The governments present at this conference agreed and stated that
they "believed in the necessity of the establishment of a general
international organisation.

Thus the idea of a world organization

which was suggested in the Atlantic Charter continued to be a topic
of vital concern among the Allies.

During the Moscow Conference,

Stalin was informed that President Roosevelt and Prime Minister
Churchill had made preparations at the Washington and Quebec con
ference for a second front in France.

Stalin "was so pleased as

to promise that when the European war ended he would enter the
5
conflict against J a p a n . L a t e r , in a meeting between President
Roosevelt, Brirne Minister Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek at Cairo,
which was held between November 22 and 26, 19^3» the three men
agreed that the war would continue until Japan had accepted the
9

unconditional surrender and that the territories taken from China
in and after 189^ would be given back to her.

Also at the Cairo

Conference, they decided that Korea should be free and independent.
Stalin was not at this meeting because Chiang Kai-shek was there,
and Stalin felt that his presence might provoke Japan to attack
Russia, a confrontation which the Soviets were anxious to avoid at
that time.
5
^Thomas A, Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People
(New York: Apple tcn-Century-Crofis, 19© 57 P. 759.
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Despite the importance of the Atlantic Charter, the Casablanca
Conference, the Moscow Conference and the Cairo Conference, the next
conference between the Allied forces was probably the most significant,
Fes? the first time, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and
Marshal Stalin met face to face at the Teheran Conference which was
held between November 28 and December 1, 1943#

Cordell Hull, in

October of the same year, convinced Stalin that the Soviet leader
must meet with Churchill and Roosevelt,

Stalin suggested the meeting

take place at Teheran, for he would leave Moscow only if his destina
tion enabled him to be in direct touch with his General Staff and
Teheran was held by the Soviet Army,

Stalin also had the feeling

that his armies had done better work than the Allied armies 5 and if
he had the conference at Teheran, it might elevate his position,^
Finally, Churchill end Roosevelt agreed to the Teheran meeting.

At

the Teheran Conference, Roosevelt let Stalin know that he was in dis
agreement with Churchill about the conduct of the war and the plans
for post-war peace, and Stalin proposed that Roosevelt should take
7
the "chair" during the meetings/

A possible reason for Roosevelt’s

action was that he wanted to hear both sides of the story before he
o
committed himself to the British or the Russians,
But, at Teheran,
6
Isaac Deutscher- Stalin s A Political Biography (London 1 Oxford
University'Press, 1949)* P# 503#
7
Chester tfilmot and H, S, Commager, "Uas Yalta A Calamity?**, New
York Times Magazine, August 3» 1952, p. 7.
o
Ibid,a p, 46,
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Roosevelt found Stalin to be correct, stiff, and solemnly incommunio
cative*
He did try to break through, but only the little stabs at
Churchill amused Stalin6 Roosevelt is quoted as saying, " • • • I
don't know a good Russian from a bad Russian . , , I don’t understand
IQ
the Russians," *
the conference,

Stalin and Churchill represented polar positions at
Roosevelt stood between them, although he was closer

to Churchill than to Stalin,

Stalin viewed Churchill and Roosevelt

as the representatives of the capitalist classj consequently, he
connected little importance to their professions of democracy.

The

two most important facets of the Teheran Conference were the Big
Three’s first meeting and, second, the important decision involving
the Allied assault on Europe,

They decided on "overlord,M which

called for Great Britain and the United States to attack Europe on
the French coast rather than through the Balkans,

Stalin realized

that with the Allies invading France, Europe would be cut into two
areas of political influence, for while the British and Americans were
assaulting Prance, Russia was to attack the Balkans and the Eastern
front to create a diversion.

Thus, Russian troops would clear the

area in the East, resulting in the creation of spheres#
that "this was a moment of Stalin’s supreme triumph,"

11

It was stated
It was also

o
'Deutscher, Stalin? A Political Biography, p, 508,

10
Francis Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew (New York:

1966), p. 72.
Deutscher, Stalin» A Folltleal Biography, p. 508.

Viking Press,
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reported that only Stalin and Churchill were aware of its implica
tions* Eastern Europe was to he Russia's zone of influence.

The

question of Hussia's entry into the Pacific Wax was again discussed
at Teheran.

Roosevelt proposed that American heavy bombers be based

north of Vladivostok and that the United States have access to Soviet
ports in the East for the possible deployment of naval forces,

Roose

velt also requested the immediate exchange of military intelligence
concerning the Japanese.

Stalin agreed that these proposals should

be studied with some concern and that he would not interfere with
the sovereignty of China over Manchuria and the recognition of the
status quo in Outer Mongolia.

Stalin suggested theinternationaliza

tion of the Port of Dairen, not a lease.

These issues later became

the basis for the discussions at Yalta regarding the Soviet entry
into the Japanese Wax,
The stage for the Yalta Conference was rapidly being set.
The Teheran Conference, not a treaty but another important executive
agreement, was to have the impact of an international treaty.
The final discussion of the plans for a world organization
prior to the Yalta Conference was held at Dumbarton Oaks.

Repre

sentatives of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union
met from August 21 to October 7 of 19^.

They decided on the idea

and purposes which later were reflected in the United Nations*
organization.

The diplomats from the three major powers decided

that there should be a General Assembly, Security Council and other
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numerous instrumentalities.

The Soviet representative, Andrei

Gromyko, proposed that all of the sixteen Soviet Republics have
seats in the General Assembly and that the Great Powers should
have the veto power in the Security Council,

The basic obligations

and responsibilities were decided upon which would have to be
assumed by the participating states if it were to be an effective
organization.

The matters of voting procedure in the Security

Council and the number of votes in the General Assembly were left
open for later conferences.
The time between the Dumbarton Oaks Conference and the Yalta
Conference is an extremely important issue.

The war was of course

advanced, but Great Britain and the Soviet Union made, some impor
tant agreements which would later affect the Yalta discussions.
In June of 19^, the British suggested that Rumania and Bulgaria
be treated as part of the Russian zone and that Britain take Greece.
This was done because Churchill realized his defeat at the Teheran
Conference, and he wanted to keep the Russians out of Greece,

12

This was confirmed in October of 1 9 ^ when Eden came to Moscow,
The Conference decided that between seventy-five and eighty per cent
of Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania would be Russian while the British
would carry twenty to thirty per cent. Churchill and Stalin agreed
that the Soviets and British would split fifty-fifty in Yugoslavia,
Prime Minister Churchill contacted President Roosevelt about

~'2Ibid.. p. 515.

13roid.. p. 516.
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th© agreements? and he wanted Harriraan, if agreeable to Churchill
and Stalin, to attend the meetings in order to report back to him.
This was approved,

Roosevelt also suggested that their plan for the

Balkans should be tested on a three-month trial and that care should
be taken to snake it clear that no post-war spheres of influence were
being established.

ih

Roosevelt did not inform the Department of

State about this situation until June 12, 19^4; and, thus, the
actions had already been partly carried out.
Stalin had established two principles to which he tried to get
the Allies to agree.

The first was that he was free to intervene

against the pro-Nazi and Fascist groups and to establish a democratic
order in the countries neighboring the Soviet Union.

The second was

that the governments of these countries should be friendly to the
Soviets.

These two principles came into play for the first time

regarding Poland.
The Teheran Documents had been kept secret, but on January 22,
19^4, Prime Minister Churchill tried to persuade Premier Mikolajczyk
and Foreign Minister Romer to agree on five points.

The first one

was that the Polish government (in London) was to accept the so-called
Curzon Line as a basis far negotiations with the Soviet government.
They were to have a final settlement of the eastern frontier to be
linked with the grant of East Prussia to Poland along with Danzig and
Upper Silesia to the Oder River.

All the Poles left on the Soviet

^Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, p. 1^55*
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side of Poland’s eastern frontier were to have the right to return
to Poland, and all the German population within the new Polish
borders was to be removed#

These enumerated solutions were to

receive the approved and guarantee of the three principal United
Nations countries.

The Soviet radio broadcast appeals for the

underground in Warsaw to revolt as the Red Armies moved closer.
General Bor was convinced of the accuracy of the broadcast when
he learned that Premier Mikolajczyk of the London exile government
arrived in Moscow, and under his leadership, the underground troops
revolted at 5*00 p, m. on August i, 194^,

Mikolajczyk was forced

to realize that the London government was going to lose, and the
National Committee of Liberation, as well as fifty per cent of the
cabinet pests, would be from the Lublin government, and the eastern
frontier of Poland would have to be approximately the Curzon Line,
He was assured on August 9» 1944, by Stalin that the Soviets would
send military aid to General Bor*s forces in Warsaw,
was never done.

This, however,

The Soviet government, with the help of Boleslaw

Bierut, a known communist, Osobka-Morawski, the Chairman of the
Soviet-created Committee of National Liberation, and Marshal RolaZymierski, who was acting on orders from Moscow, set up the Lublin
Committee.

This committee was to discredi the Polish government in

London, fcr now that the Polish Home Army had been broken by the Nazis,

15

Arthur Lane, I Saw Poland Betrayed (Bostons
19*8). P. 4?.

Western Islands,
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there was no remaining leadership to dispute the authority of the
Lublin group*
On December 18, 19^> Secretary of State Edward Stettinius
stated that the United States government stood for a free and inde
pendent Poland, but the United States would not raise any objection
to the delineation of Poland’s frontiers before the ending of hos
tilities, if a mutual agreement were reached by the United Nations
(which was not yet a functioning body),

Stettinius continued to say

that if, as a result of such an agreement, the Polish government and
people should favor the transfer of national groups, the United States
would assist Poland in the transfers.

This was, of course, subject to

legislative authority in regard to aiding any such transfer.

But, on

December 31» 19^*, "the Lublin Committee officially announced itself
as the Provisional Government of Poland, and on January 1, 19^5»
Stettinius stated that "this government /the United States/ Continues
to maintain formal diplomatic relations with the Polish Government-inexile in London,"

17

On January 5, Stalin recognized the Lublin govern

ment as the Provisional Government of Poland.

Churchill replied that

he was hampered in his protest by the fact that he had made agreements
with the Soviets,
In December of 19^, Stalin told Averell Harriman that the
Soviets* interest in the East centered around the re-establishment of
their territories as they had existed before the Russo-Japanese War of
ibid.. p. 53.

17ibia..

p.

75.
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1905.

The property included the lower half of the island Sakhalin,

the Kuril.© Islands, the lease ports of Dairen and Port Arthur, and
those railroads in Manchuria which were built by Russians under con
tract with the Chinese government, specifically the Chinese Eastern
Railway, a direct line from the Trans-Siberian Railroad through to
Vladivoslok and the South Manchurian Railroad making the connection
IS
to Dairen,
But, before this, during the Moscow Conference in 19**3>
Stalin told Cordell Hull that when Germany was defeated, the Soviets
would join in defeating Japan,

Hull states that ’’the Marshal's

statement of his decision was forthright.

He made it emphatically,

it was entirely unsolicited and he asked nothing in return,"

19

Hull

felt that this was so important he sent the message back to President
Roosevelt, half in Army code and the other half in Navy code,

Stalin

was changing his mind, and this alteration was to play a big part in
the Yalta Conference,

The last meeting of the Big Three had been at

Teheran more than a year earlier.

Many things had changed; and, with

the end of the war approaching, Allied leaders needed to plan for
world peace after the defeat of Germany and Japan,
Polish question had to be settled.

Problems like the

The first suggestion for another

meeting was made by President Roosevelt in a letter to Marshal Stalin
dated July 17» 19^» and marked Top Secret, Priority,

The letter reads

18
William A, Karrinan, "Our Wartime Relations with the Soviet
Union and the Agreements Reached at Yalta," U, S. Department of State
Bulletin, XX¥. September 3. 1951» P* 372.
19
7Hull, Memoirs of Cordell Hull, p. 1310,
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Tilings are moving so fast and so success
fully that I feel there should be a meeting
between you and Mr. Churchill and me in the
reasonably near future. The Prime Minister
is in hearty accord with this thought. I am
now on a trip in the far West and must be in
Washington for several weeks on my return.
It would, therefore, be best forme to have a
meeting between the tenth and fifteenth of
September. The most central point for you
and me would be the north of Scotland. I
could go by ship or by plane. Your Army is
doing so magnificently that the hop would be
much shorter to Scotland than the one taken
by Molotov two years ago. I hope you can let
me have your thoughts* Secrecy and security
can be maintained either aboard ship or on
shore. /The underlined was admitted before
delivery to StalinJ
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In a letter dated September Zk9 19^4, from Ambassador Harriman
to the President, It was reported that Stalin was afraid his doctors
would not let him travel.
Stalin

Harriman also reported that it had taken

two weeks to recover from an ear attack he had suffered during

his flight from Teheran, andJ&s recent illnesshad been due to a
recent trip to the Russian front.

In conclusion, Harriman stated,

”1 am satisfied that Stalin is anxious to meet you but he is defi21

nitely worried about his health, ”

later, Stalin suggested in a

i

letter to Roosevelt that he would like to meet at the end of November
in the Black Sea axea, and he stated that Churchill agreed.

Roosevelt

responded to Churchill on October 22 that the Black Sea idea depended
20
U, S. Department of State, Conference at Malta and Yalta
(Washington, D, C.s Government Printing Office, i955j» P* 3.
21Ibid,, p. 5.
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on the ability to get-through the Dardanelles safely, for he wished
to travel by ship,

Roosevelt than suggested Cyprus or Athens for

the site of the conference,

Churchill liked this idea and replied

that he would check into it, but Stalin still wanted acceptance of
S
.

the Black Sea,

Roosevelt stated that Dr, MeIntire said there were

bad health conditions in the Black Sea area.

In another letter to

Churchill, dated the 14th of November, Roosevelt said that the con
ference would have more meaning if it were held after the inaugura
tion,

Since the meeting place was still undecided upon, Roosevelt

suggested that the end of January or the first of February of 19^5
would be a better time for the conference.

He also suggested

Jerusalem or Alexandria for the place because his advisors told
him they did not want to risk a "capital" ship through the straits,
for it would take too much guarding.

22

After the elections, Roosevelt was suffering from physical
and mental strain accompanied by a loss of appetite.

He was down

to 170 pounds, and deepening lines were already appearing on his
face.

But, Stalin still refused to go to the Mediterranean Sea

because of his doctor's advice and the fact that he wanted to be
able, as at Teheran, to b© in close contact with the Soviet Army,
On December 30, 19^, President Roosevelt agreed to go to Yalta,
This was followed a day later by Churchill's agreement.
Before discussing the Malta and Yalta Conferences, it is
^Ibld.- p. 15.
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necessary to mention the military and political situation at the
time of the conferences as well as the aims and purposes the leaders
held,

While President Roosevelt was meeting with Prime Minister

Churchill and Marshal Stalin in the Crimea, American and British
troops had just recovered the ground lost in the Battle of the
Bulge,

the Allies had not yet reached the Rhine, and the advance

in Italy had hogged down.

Having swept through most of Poland and

East Prussia, Soviet troops had reached some points on Germany's
Oder River,

Most of Hungary had been captured, and the Yugoslav

Partisans had captured Belgrade In November, 19^#

By the time

of the Yalta Conference, Poland and all of Eastern Europe had fallen
to the Soviet troops.

United States farces were locked in a bloody

battle on Iwo Jima and had not yet taken Okinawa,

Some critics

feel that the United States was in no position to argue at Yalta;
and, if it had used the Balkan strategy that Churchill suggested,
rather than the English Channel for a major offensive, -the Russians
would have been contained.

But in view of the military situation at

that time, American military officials deemed this idea too expen
sive and the Balkan area too difficult a terrain for a major Western
offensive.

Moreover, the United States could not have moved fast

enough to be victorious before October of 1 9 ^ when the Russians
reached Warsaw,
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Thus, when one takes the time to discover the

23
•^Rudolph Winnacker, 11Yalta* Another Munich,” Virginia Quarterly
Review, XXIV, Autumn, 19^, p. 53^ •
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military and political conditions in the early months of 19^5t he can
realize the tremendous difficulties involved in a policy of opposition
to the Soviet Union at that time.

The objectives of World War II were

unconditional surrender of the Axis powers and the establishment of a
world order of cooperation which was to be based on the principles set
forth in the Atlantic Charter,

The United States needed the help of

Russia to end the war with Germany and to set up a successful world
organisation.

Thus, the United States' aims at the Yalta Conference

were to smooth over the problems of Dumbarton Oaks and to establish
the United Nations,

It was also necessary to settle the future

strategy in Europe and the Ear East regarding the invasion of Germany
and the Soviet Union's entry into the war with Japan,

Pear of

impairing Allied unity was still another problem facing the Big
Three,

The United States Ambassador to Russia, William A, Harriman,

summed up the Allied attitude toward Russia by stating*
The primary objective of the American and
British Governments in our relations with the
Soviet Union during the war was to keep the
Soviet Army as an effective fighting force
against Hitler, It was also our objective to
encourage the Soviet Union to join in the war
against Japan at the earliest possible date.2^
The last objective regarding the Soviet entry into the Japanese
war was needed soon enough to save American lives.
President Roosevelt felt that his purpose at Yalta was again to
bring Germany to defeat at the earliest date, conquer Japan, and build
Harriman, "Our Wartime Relations with the Soviet Union," p. 3?2,
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the foundations for the world peace organization.

The President

trusted Stalin and believed that the wishes of the Russian and
American peoples were compatiblej thus, he was confident of winning
25
the Soviets1 lasting cooperation at Yalta,.

The President and his

advisors Hull and Hopkins felt that diplomacy based on friendship
would bring a sympathetic response from the Soviet representatives,

26

Roosevelt believed that his role at Yalta should be that of a raediatcr between Churchill and Stalin,

27

Although pertinent State Department reports and data were on
board the ship during the voyage to Yalta, it is reported that the
President preferred to rest rather than study these documents.
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Among these United States plans were those made between November of
1 9 ^ and January of 19^5 concerning Central-Eastern Europe,

On Janu

ary 18, 19^5, just before Roosevelt left far Malta, Secretary Stetti
nius presented the President with the black book entitled, Briefing
29
Papers,

The Briefing Papers contained most of the material needed

for the imminent discussions in the Crimea,
^Chester Wilmot, Struggle For Europe (New Yorks
P. 639.

Harper, 1952),

26Ibld.. -p. 639.
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Contained in this State Department document were problems and
suggested alternatives, for guiding President Roosevelt’s strategy at
Yalta,

Many delicate subjects were dealt with, particularly a dis

cussion of the Soviet objectives in Eastern Europe,

The State Depart

ment suggested the establishment of an "Emergency High Commission for
Liberated Europe” that, with the support of the’Big Four,” would help
form popular governments in liberated Eastern Europe,

30

The prin

ciples mentioned in the Atlantic Charter had been formulated in the
"Declaration of Liberated Europe” and would be used in this effort.
Other topics dealt with in the Briefing Papers included the unifica
tion of China, spheres of influence in Europe, loans to the Soviet
Union, post-war status of Korea, and Soviet participation in the war
against Japan with consideration of possible Soviet support of the
Chinese Communists,
Marshal Stalin entered the Yalta Conference with a sense of
superiority of Russia’s contribution toward the approaching victory
over Germany,

He had very definite aims as to the economic recon

struction of Russia and to the future security of Soviet territory
by establishing friendly and cooperative governments between Germany
and the Soviet Union,

For twice, in a relatively short time, bel-

ligerant nations had used the Polish Corridor as a road to Russia,
In addition, Stalin came to bargain for the price of Russia’s entry
into the Japanese &ar,

Stalin believed he had the advantage because

30
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of tbs Soviet Armies* campaigns? in fact, at the beginning of the
conference, Russian troops were just fifty miles from Berlin,

On

the other hand, Prime Minister Churchill was apprehensive when he
arrived at the conference, for he remembered what had happened at the
31
Teheran Confeocenee,
With his purposes and objectives in mind, President Roosevelt
left Washington by a special train on January 22, 1945*

On the 23rd

he sailed from an East coast port on the Quincy, an American naval
cruiser which arrived at Malta on February 2.

The President was met

by Secretary Stettinius, Harry Hopkins, William A, Harriman and Win
ston Churchill,

While at Malta, Churchill and Roosevelt met for a

discussion before Yalta,

Churchill hoped to reach an agreement with

President Roosevelt that they could propose to Stalin, but Roosevelt
wanted to refrain from making any agreements so that Stalin would not
feel he was dealing with any sort of an Anglo-American delegation,
Churchill relates that "no hard and fast agreements were made on any
of the political issues.

Those naturally were to form the subject

of the triple conference and they were carefully kept open for the
full meeting.

32

Even though Roosevelt had been warned by Harriman

on January 10, 1945, of the Soviets* policy in Eastern Europe of
using secret police, local communist parties and troops to assure
31
Winston Churchill, Closing the Ring (Boston:
Mifflin Co,, 1951 )»■ PP. 405-407.

Houghton
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the establishment of favorable governments, Roosevelt was less suspicious of the Soviets* post-war intentions than was Churchill*
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At dawn, the planes left the Malta airfield in ten-minute intervals,
with the Saki airfield as their destination.

President Roosevelt

flew in the Sacred Cow, the airplane especially built for him which
included an elevator for his convenience.

After the arrival at Saki,

the party motored over the mountainous terrain to Yalta.

The five-

hour trip took them through the devastated areas from which the
Germans had been driven.

The road was guarded by Soviet soldiers,

some of whom were women, who were well armed.
President Roosevelt stayed at Livadia Palace which had been
a summer palace for the Czar.

Under the direction of Dr, Me Intire,

the President’s room and the palace were cleaned with a ten per cent
solution of D,D,Te in kerosene.

The beds, bedding, and rugs were

given three sprayings and then dusted with D.D.T.

There were also

daily inspections of the quarters to make sure they were clean.
Lieutenant Commander George Fox gave President Roosevelt an alcohol
rub and light massage before bed every night,

Churchill and the

principal members of the British delegation had the Vorontsov Villa
which was about five miles from the Livadia Palace,
Molotov stayed at the Yusupov Palace.

Stalin and

The remainder of the United

33
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States and British delegations stayed in two rest houses about
twenty minutes away.

The meetings between Roosevelt, Churchill

and Stalin were held on the ground floor of the Livadia Palace for
the convenience of the President,
The United States* cast at the Yalta Conference included
President Roosevelt; Secretary of State Edward Stettiniusj Fleet
Admiral William Leahy, who was the United States Navy Chief of
Staff to the President} Harry Hopkins, Special Assistant to the
President; Justice James Byrnes, who was the Director of the Office
of Wax Mobilisation and Reconversion} General of the Army George C,
Marshall, who was the United States Army Chief of Staff} Fleet
Admiral Ernest King, Chief of Naval Operations and Commander-inchief of the United States Fleet} Lt, General Brehon Somervell,
Commanding General Army Service Forces} Vice Admiral Emory Land,
War Shipping Administration} Major General Laurence Kuter, Staff
of the Commanding General} William Harriman, Ambassador to the
Soviet Union} H. Freeman Matthews, Director of European Affairs,
State Department} Alger Hiss, Deputy Director, Office of Special
Political Affairs, Department of State} and Charles E. Bohlen,
Assistant to the Secretary of State; together with political,
military, and technical advisors.
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Representing the United Kingdom were Prime Minister Churchill;
Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Lord Leathers,
35
^Congressional Record, 79th Cong,, 1st Sess,, p, 1025.
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Minister of War Transport! Sir A, Clark Kerr, Ambassador at Moscowj
Sir Alexander C&dogan, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs? Sir Edward Bridges, Secretary of the War Cabinet? Field Mar

shal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff; Marshal
of. the Royal Air Force Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff;
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, First Sea Lord; General
Sir Hastings Ismay, Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defense;
together with Field Marshal Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander,
Mediterranean theatre; and Field Marshal Wilson, head of tbs British
Joint Staff Mission at Washington, together with military and diplomatic advisors.
Those representing the Soviet Union were Marshal J. V. Stalin,
Chairman of the Council of Peoples Commissars of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics? V. M. Molotov, Peoples Commissar for Foreign
Affairs of the U.S.S.R.; Admiral Nicholai Kuznetsov, Peoples Commis
sar for the Navy; Army General Aleksei Antonov, Deputy Chief of the
General Staff of the Red Army? Andrei Vyshinski, Deputy Peoples
Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.; Ivan Maiski, Deputy
Peoples Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R; Marshal of
Aviation Sergei Khydyakov; Fedor Gusev, Ambassador in Great Britain;
and Andrei Gromyko, Ambassador to the United States.
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The French government was not invited to attend the Conference.
3 Ibid.. 1025.
37
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Harry Hopkins, who was in France before the Conference, gave the
French the feeling that no major decisions would be made behind
de Gaulle's back*

De Gaulle stated that the Big Three's decisions

would not be binding on the French until he had had the opportunity
to discuss them with the major Allies on an equal basis and had
accepted them*

The French press gave the opinion that it was

President Roosevelt who did not want de Gaulle because of Roose
velt's ” , . . belief that the Big Three would have trouble enoi^jh
on their hands without adding a man who, as the French put it, is
oo

not noted for 'putting oil in the machinery' of diplomacy,"
Secretary Stettinius reported that the President would not recog
nize de Gaulle until it could be proved ihat he was really supported
by the French people themselves,
that he was offended,

De Gaulle's personal reaction was

but not surprised, for he realized Francehad

not reached her role as a world power yet.
There was no single official record of the proceedings nor was
there any stenotypist recording every word, but each delegation kept
its own notes.

Sir Edward Bridges took the notes for the British

and Charles Bohlen for the United States,
February

19^5*

The conference began

At

10:30 a, m,, President Roosevelt

met withhis

advisors, followed by

a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff,

New York Times, February 11, 19^5*
39
/
Edward Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians (New York:
Doubleday, 19^9)» P. 103.
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United States'wanted better communication among the Allies, more
coordination and exchange of information between General Eisenhower,

Field Marshal Alexander, and the Soviet General Staff.

They also

talked of the United Nations, Germany, Poland, the control commis
sions for Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary.

The Joint Chiefs decided

to adopt the United States* proposal for the voting formula and to
call for a United Nations Conference.

They also decided to adopt

the Emergency European High Commission to function from the end of
the war until the creation of the United Nations,

In regard to the

treatment of Germany, the Joint Chiefs agreed on the control of the
administrative details for the zones of occupation, and Germany*s
boundaries.

They opposed the indiscriminate mass exchange of

minorities with neighboring states, and the abolition of German
self^sufficiency was agreed upon.

Discussions regarding Poland

resulted in the acceptance of her boundaries as being the Curzon
Line in the North and South and the Eastern line of Lwow Province,
The transfer of German territory was to be limited to East Prussia
(except Koenigsherg going to Russia), a small coastal salient of
Pomerania and Upper Silesia,

They also agreed on the formation of

new representative governments pledged to free elections with the
inclusion of the Mikolajczky government in Poland.

With regard to

the Allied Control Commission in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, the
Allied diplomats suggested that the United States* representative
be assured of his freedom of movement and that there would be

30

consultation before decisions were made*

On the Iran question, the

Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested that the President should seek Soviet
agreement on not pressing for oil concessions until the end of hos
tilities and urged the withdrawal of the Allied troops*

In China,

the Joint Chiefs suggested that Roosevelt seek Soviet-British support
for United States efforts to bring about a Kuomintang-Communist
agreement*
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This was the advice for the Resident’s use in future

discussions in the Yalta agenda.
When Resident Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin met at 4:00 p. m.,
Charles Bohlen, Mr, Molotov and Mr, Pavlov were also in attendance.
The informal discussion started with Roosevelt’s kidding Stalin about
a bet he made on whether United States troops would capture Manila
before the Soviets occupied Berlin,
bet on the United States,

Stalin stated that he had better

They then got down to more serious matters,

Stalin agreed with the idea of establishing better communications
among the Allied troops, Roosevelt then asked how he had gotten along
with de Gaulle, and Stalin gave the impression that he did not think
too much of him or of the French war effort,

Stalin then asked the

President’s opinion of giving the French a zone in Germany.

Roosevelt

replied that it was a good idea and that they ought to do it out of
kindness,

With this remark, Molotov stated that that would be the

only reason for giving the French a zone,
40
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At 5*00 p. ia,, the first plenary meeting between the Big Three
was held in the Livadia Palace.
basically military matters,

This initial discussion concerned

Stalin suggested that President Roose

velt take the "chair” as he had done at Teheran? when this was done,
General Antonov, Chief of the Russian General Staff, began with a
circumstantial and detailed account of the progress of the recent
Russian offensive in Poland,

General Marshal followed with a descrip

tion of the Battle of the Bulge and of the Anglo-American plans for
resuming the offensive.

Admiral Cunningham concluded with some

remarks about the anticipated resumption of the German U-Boat warfare.

41

The Military Staffs would meet the following day at noon,

and the Big Three would meet at 4;00 p, m, to discuss the political
treatment of Germany,
That evening there was a dinner at 8*30 p. m. in the Livadia
Palace at which Stalin, Roosevelt, Churchill, and some of their chief
advisors were present.

The discussion led to the Great Powers*

responsibility to the lesser powers,

Vishinsky was reported as

stating that "Russia will never agree to the right of the small
42
powers to judge an act of the Great Powers,"

This viewpoint is

important to note, for the topic of discussion for this tripartite
dinner was the voice of the smaller powers in a post-war peace organ
isation,
41
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On the second day of the conference, February 5? the discus
sions attacked the basic problems to be solved at Yalta,

These

topics fell into the categories of the United Nations, the questions
involving Europe (especially Germany and Poland), and the Far East,
The day started with another Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting at
10100 a, m.

After the minutes of the previous meeting were approved,

the Chiefs of Staff talked about the British idea of not returning to
Malta after the conference, the allocation of the zones of occupation
in Germany, and the Russian participation in the war against Japan,
They wanted to have Marshal Stalin's answers to two questions.

First,

did he need to keep the supply line across the Pacific to Eastern
Siberia open, and second, would he assure the United States' being
granted air bases in Soviet territory?

This meeting was followed by

the first Tripartite Military Meeting as proposed at the end of the
first plenary meeting the day before.

Beginning at 12i00 noon in the

lusupov Palace, they talked about the coordination of the offensive
operations of the Allies, the movement of German forces from Norway,
the liaison arrangements, naval operations in support of the land
offensive, the possible date for the end of the war, hopefully July 1,
The final discussion involved their future business.

At the next

meeting, they wished to talk over the coordination of air operations,
shuttle bombing, and the war in the Far East,

A luncheon meeting of

the Foreign Ministers followed at 1*30 in the Yusupov Palace,

The sub

jects, after the toasts, included treatment of Germany along with the
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economic matters relative to Germany,

The Foreign Ministers decided

that the conference should be named the Crimea Conference,
At 2*30? President Roosevelt held a meeting with certain men in
his advisory staff, among whom were Kopkins, Matthews and Bohlen.

At

this time, the President was informed of.the happenings during the
morning Foreign Ministers® meeting.
The second plenary meeting started at 4*00 p. m, in the Livadia
Palace,

President Roosevelt opened the meeting by stating that he

wished to talk about the future treatment of Germany and by distri
buting a map showing the zones "agreed upon by the European Advisory
Commission but not yet accepted by the three governments,

43

Stalin

then stated that he would like to include in the discussion the topic
a

of partitioning Germany, for there were no agreements made at either
Teheran or at Moscow,

For example, if the Big Three were to establish

a government in Germany, would each section have its own government?
Stalin felt there was a need to work out definite terms of the uncon
ditional surrender and the types of reparations and their amounts,
Churchill stated that he felt the topic of German partitioning was
too complicated to solve at Yalta, but he stated that his mind could
be changed,

Churchill went on to state that they had agreed that the

German territory conquered by the Soviet Army would form part of the
Polish agreement, but he Wondered whether the Ruhr and the Saar should
be under the French, made independent, or be controlled by a world
43
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organization for an extended period.

He felt that these questions

required careful study, but he had not formed any set plans on the
subject.

Churchill further suggested that the Big Three should set

up a body to investigate these problems and report their findings
before any decision was made,

President Roosevelt suggested that

they agree that Germany should be dismembered, end charge the Foreign
Ministers with the task of working out the details.

The Foreign Mini

sters were to add to the surrender terms a clause stating that Germany
was to be dismembered by the best method.

There had been some debate

about putting in the dismemberment terms and whether or not to include
the details in the surrender terms.

Thus, it was referred to the

Foreign Ministers to decide and then report their findings.

The next

topic which was discussed was that of giving the French a zone of
occupation in Germany,

Churchill wanted the French to have a zone

which would come from the area granted to the British and Americans,
and he thought that the French should also have a role in the control
machinery, particularly since the British might need help in maintain
ing their zone.

When Stalin asked President Roosevelt how long United

States troops could occupy Germany, Roosevelt replied*
I can get the people and Congress to cooperate
fully for peace but not to keep an army in
Europe for a long time. Two years would be
the limit.^
!

Stalin still did not want the French to have a zone, contending

44
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that they had contributed very little to the defeat of Germany,

Chur

chill countered that the French must have a zone, for they were Germany’s
most important neighbor.

The Big Three finally decided that the French

should get a zone and that they would let the Foreign Ministers decide
the part France was to play in the administration of occupied Germany,
€

Deputy Commissar Maisky then presented the Soviet plan for German
reparations.

He suggested that the Allies remove from the German

national wealth all plants, machine tools, and rolling stock, to be
completed within two years after the war,

Germany would also make

annual payments over a period of ten years, thus restoring the Russian
economy and establishing the security of Europe,

The Deputy Commissar

felt it necessary to cut down the German heavy industry by eighty per
cent.

He stated that the priority for nations receiving the repara

tions would be based on the proportional contribution that each nation
had made to winning the war and its loss of material.
wanted no less than ten billion dollars in reparations,

The Soviets
Maisky con

cluded by suggesting that a reparations committee from the three govemraents meet in Moscow to work out the details.

45

President Roosevelt

told the conference that the American people wanted the Germans to live,
but not with a higher standard of living than other states, for
instance, the Soviet Union,

He would support the idea of establishing

a reparations committee as suggested, and he thought that this committee
should use a twenty billion total with half going to the Soviet Union as
45
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a base for discussion.
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Churchill felt Maisky*s proposal was exces

sive because they would never get that much money out of a defeated

4*7

nation, and he said that he could not picture a starving Germany, '

It was then agreed that the suggestion for a reparations committee be
turned over to the Foreign Ministers, who would then report back.

The

Big Three set a meeting time for the next day and then adjourned.
The third day of the conference, February 6, began with the
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at iOiOO a, m. at the Vor
ontsov Villa,

After the approval of the minutes, they discussed the

levels of supply of petroleua products in the United Kingdom and In
Northwest Europe,

Other topics included the probable date for the

end of the war against Germany, the provision of landing tracked
vehicles for the Mediterranean, and the allocation of zones of occu
pation in Germany.

Liaisons with the Soviet High Command talked about

the Anglo-American strategic bombing in Eastern Europe. They decided
to hold their next meeting at 10:00 a, m,, Thursday the 8th, to com
plete any outstanding items on the agenda.

This meeting was followed

by the second Tripartite Military Meeting, held at noon in the Yusupov
Palace,

Field Marshal Brooke presided, and the topics for discussion

included the bomb line and liaison arrangements, the coordination of
offensive operations, the exchange of information regarding river
crossing techniques and equipment, the bases for the United States
46
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strategic -bomber-farces in the Vienna-Bu&apest area, provisions of
the Soviet airfields for damaged British night aircraft, enemy
intelligence, the Pacific operations, very long-range bomber opera
tions against Japan, operations in Burma and China,

In addition, the

Tripartite meeting settled the question of their future business.

48

Also at noon there was a meeting of the Foreign Ministers at
Livadia Palace,

The first business was to issue a press release,

approved by Eden, Molotov and Stettinius, which read*
The President of the United States of America,
the Premier of the Soviet Union and the Prime
Minister of Great Britain, accompanied by their
Chiefs of Staff, the three Foreign Secretaries
and other advisors are now meeting in the Black
.Sea area.
Their purpose is to concert plans far com
pleting the defeat of the common enemy and for
building, with the Allies, firm foundations for
a lasting peace. Meetings are proceeding con
tinuously.
The Conference began with military discussions.
The present situation on all the European fronts
has been reviewed and the fullest information far
joint military operations in the final phase of the
war against Nazi Germany, The military staffs of
the three governments are now engaged in working
out jointly the detailed plans.
Discussions of problems involved in establishing
a secure peace have also begun. These discussions
will cover joint plans for the occupation and con
trol of Germany, the political and economic problems
of liberated Europe and proposals far the earliest
possible establishment of a permanent international
organization to maintain peace.
A communique will be Issued at the conclusion
of the Conference,**9
48
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There was a luncheon at Is00 p, m, between Churchill and Roose
velt,

Hopkins, Byrnes, Harriman and Cadogan also attended.

The

luncheon lasted until 3*00, and the third plenary meeting started
at 4tQ0,

This meeting began with the reading of the voting formula

by Secretary Stettinius,
It was agreed at Dumbarton Oaks that certain
matters would remain under consideration for the
future settlement. Of these, the principal one
was that of the voting procedure to be followed
in the Security Council,
At Dumbarton Oaks, the three delegations
thoroughly explored the whole question. Since
that time the matter has received continuing
intensive study by each of the three governments.
On December 5* 1944, the President sent to
Marshal Stalin and to Prime Minister Churchill
a proposal that this matter be settled by making
Section C, Chapter VII of the Dumbarton Oaks
proposals read substantially as followst
C, Voting
1. Each member of the Security Council
should have one vote,
2. Decisions of the Security Council on
procedural matters should be made by an
affirmative vote of seven members,
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all
matters should be made by an affirmative
vote of seven members including the con
curring votes of the permanent members,
provided that, in decisions under Chapter
VIII, Section A and under the second sen
tence of Paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII,
Section C, a party to a dispute should
abstain from voting,50
Stettinius went on to give an analysis of this proposal.
We believe that our proposal is entirely
consistent with the special responsibilities of
the Great Powers fcr the preservation of the
50
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peace of the world* In this respect our
proposal calls for unqualified unanimity of
the permanent members of the Council on all
major decisions relating to the preservation
of peaceg including all economic and military
enforcement measures*
At the same time our proposal recognizes
the desirability of the permanent members frankly
stating that th© peaceful adjustment of any con
troversy which may arise is a matter of general
world interest In which any sovereign member
state involved should have a right to present
its case.
We believe that unless this freedom of
discussion in the Council is permitted, the
establishment of the World Organisation which
we all so earnestly desire in order to save th©
world from the tragedy of suiother war would be
seriously jeopardized. Without full and free
discussion in the Council, the Organization even
if it could be established, would be vastly
different from the one we have contemplated*
The paper which we have placed before the
other two delegations sets forth the text of
the provisions which I have read and lists
specifically those decisions of the Council
which, under our proposals, would require
unqualified unanimity, and, separately, those
matters in the area in which any party to a
dispute would abstain from casting a vote,51
Secretary Stettinius explained that there was a necessity
far unanimity between the permanent members in order to preserve
the peace and there should be provisions for a fair hearing for all
the members of the organization, both large and small.

He went on

to state that the admission of new members, the suspension of a
member, expulsion of a member and the elections of the Secretary
General would require all the affirmative votes in the Security Council

Ltf)

along with the votes of the General Assembly,

It was also suggested

that removal of threats to the peace and suppression of breaches of
peace should be subject to a series of questions*

whether or not the
•

.

parties to a dispute can settle it on their own with the recommenda
tion of the Security Council, what actions by a nation would consti
tute a threat to the peace or a breach of it, and what measures should
be taken by the Security Council to restore and maintain the peace
and in what manner these actions should be carried out, and lastly,
whether a regional agency should be authorised to take measures of
enforcement.

The Security Council must also have seven affirmative

votes for the approval of agreements for the provisions having armed
forces representing the World Organization, the formulation of plans
for a system of regulation of armaments, and the determination of
whether a nation and the activities of a regional agency are con52
sistent with the principles of the organization,-

Stettinius finally

concluded by stating that the decisions relating to the peaceful
settlement of disputes would also require the affirmation of seven
Security Council votes and the permanent members unless one of the
members was included in said dispute.
After Stettinius finished, the Soviets wanted to look the pro
posals over and they would be ready to talk about it at the next
meeting,

Churchill said that his farmer anxieties had been removed

and that he found the American proposal satisfactory.
52Xbid.. pp. 143-44.
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The leaders of the three governments then turned briefly to the
Polish question,

President Roosevelt wanted to know if they should

start this discussion or not,

Stalin stated that he would like to,

and Roosevelt suggested that the Eastern Erontier be the Curzon Line
and that the Lwow oil fields should go to Stalin, but he would not
insist on it.

The President said that he wanted Poland to be friendly

and have cooperative relations with the Soviet Union,
that Poland should be this way with all the Allies,
Churchill

Stalin replied
PrimeMinister

then stated thatthe British recognized the London Govern

ment, but they did not have any close relations

with them,Stalin

said that the Soviets would not create a Polish

governmentwithout

consulting the Polish people first and that he had already talked
with Mikolajczyk in Moscow in 19^4.

The meeting was then ended,

That evening a letter from President Roosevelt was prepared
by the State Department, and Harry Hopkins was to send it to Marshal
Stalin before bedtime.

It reads

I have been giving a great deal of thought
to our meeting this afternoon, and I want to
tell you in all frankness what is on my mind.
In so far as the Polish Government is con
cerned I am greatly disturbed that the three
great powers do not have a meeting of minds
about the political setup in Poland, It seems
to me that it puts all of us in a bad light
throughout the world to have you recognizing
one government while we and the British are
recognising another in London, I am sure this
state of affairs should not continue and that
if it does it can only lead our peoples to think
there is a break between us, which is not the
case. I am determined that there shall be no
breach between.ourselves-, and the Soviet Union,

Wl

Surely there is a way to reconcile our dif
ferences .
I was very much impressed with some of
the things you said today, particularly your
determination that your rear must he safe
guarded & g your array moves into Berlin, You
cannot, and we must not, tolerate any temporary
government which will give your armed forces
any trouble of this sort, I want you to know
that I am fully mindful of this. You must
believe me when I tell you that our people at
home look with a critical eye on what they
consider a disagreement between us at this
vital state of the war. They, in effect, say
that if we cannot get a meeting of minds now
when our armies are converging on the common
enemy, how can we get an understanding on even
more vital things in the future,
I have had to make it clear to you that we
cannot recognize the Lublin government as now
composed, and the world would regard it as a
lamentable outcome of our work here if we
parted with an open and obvious divergance
between us on this issue.
You said today that you would be prepared
to support any suggestions for the solution of
this problem which offered a fair chance of
success, and you also mentioned the possibility
of bringing some members of the Lublin govern
ment here.
Realising that we all have the same anxiety
in getting this matter settled, I would like to
develop your proposal a little and suggest that
we invite here to Yalta at once Mr, Brerut and
Mr. Osubka-Morawski from the Lublin government
and also two or three from the following list of
Poles, which according to our information would be
desirable as representatives of the other elements
of the Polish people in the development of a new
temporary government which all three of us could
recognize and support* Archbishop Sapieha of
Cracow, Vincente Witos, Mr, Zurlowski, Professor
Buyak, and Professor Kutseba. As a reason of the
presence of these Polish leaders here, we could
jointly agree with them on a provisional government
in Poland which should no doubt include some Polish
leaders from abroad such as Mr, Mikolajczuk,

^3

Mr, Grabski and Mr, Romerj the United States
Government and I feel sure the British Govern™
ment, as well, would then be prepared to examine
with your conditions in which they would dis
associate themselves from the London Government
and transfer their recognition to the new pro
visional government,
I hope I do not have to assure you that the
United States will never lend its support in any
way to any provisional government in Poland that
would be inimical to your interests.
It goes without saying that any interim
government which could be formed as a result of
our Conference with the Poles here would be
pledged to the holding of free elections in
Poland at the earliest possible date, I know
this is completely consistent with your desire
to see a new free and democratic Poland emerge
from the welter of this war.
Most sincerely yours,
F. D. Roosevelt53
This letter would figure indiscussions later in the confer
ence, for,

in the text, President Roosevelt outlined

the opinions

and suggestions of the United States which constituted policy of the
American state.
The fourth day of the conference, February 7, the discussions
began with another meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at 10:00 a, m,
in the Livadia Palace,

They started by approving the minutes of the

previous day*s meeting and then discussed the utilization of the 15th
Air Force in the Vienna-Budapest area, the reciprocal agreement for
the prisoners of war, the supplies and equipment requested by the
Soviet Union, the protocol on the zones of occupation in Germany and
the administration of Berlin, the zones of limitation for the British
53
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and American air operations in the advance of the Soviet Armies,
the meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the Soviet General
Staff which they wanted on the 8th at 3s00 p. m., and a note was
sent to General Antonov.

The report by the Combined Shipping Staffs

that discussed the need for military shipping and the Russian require
ments for additional ships was read.

This meeting was followed by a

Meeting of the Foreign Ministers at noon at the Yusupov Palace,
The Foreign Ministers discussed Dumbarton Oaks, the dismemberment
of Germany, the creation of a commission to study the procedure for
the dismemberment of Germany, the integration of the French into the
German Control Machinery on the condition that the French were to
receive a zone of occupation and, finally, Germany*s reparations.
Molotov submitted the Soviet "Basic Principles of Exaction of Repar
ations from Germany," which would be reported to the meeting of the
Big Three that afternoon.
The fourth plenary meeting was held at AiOO p. m. in the
Livadia Palace,

The discussions were started with the reading of

th© decisions agreed on at the Foreign Ministers meeting that morning
Decisions adopted at the meeting of the
Three Ministers of Foreign Affairs, V, M.
Molotov, to. Stettinius and Mr, Eden,
I. Regarding the Dismemberment of Germany,
(a) A. Y. Vishinsky, Mr. Cadogan and
to. Matthews were entrusted with the prepara
tion of the final draft of Article 12 of the
instrument "unconditional surrender of Germany"
having in view the insertion in the text of
Article 12 of the word "dismemberment,"
(b) The study of the question of the pro
cedure of the dismemberment of Germany was

referred to a committee consisting of
Mr. Eden r Mr, ¥ inant and F. T, Gusen,
II. Regarding the zone of occupation in
Germany for France.
(a) The allotment to the French of a
zone in Germany to be occupied by French
occupation forces has been agreed upon,
(b) As regards to the question of the
participation of France in the Control Com
mission, M. V. Molotov and Mr. Stettinius
feel it desirable to refer the question
to the E, A, C, Mr, Eden considers it
necessary to discuss this question now and
give France a place on the Control Commission.
III. Regarding the Reparations to be exacted
from Germany,
(a) It was agreed that in paragraph one
of the Soviet proposals mention should be made
of the sacrifices borne.
(b) It was decided that the residence
of the Reparations Committee should be in the
city of Moscow. It was agreed that the com
mittee should begin its work immediately upon
the approval of the principles of the exacting
of the reparations.
(c) It was decided that the discussion
of the two documents relating to the matter of
the reparations which have been submitted by
V, M. Molotov, first, regarding the basic
principles of exacting the reparations from
Germany, and, second, regarding the organiza
tion of an Allied Reparations Committee should
be continued at the Crimea Conference.-^
Following this, Molotov then read the Soviet proposals on the
Polish Question.

The Soviets wanted the eastern frontier of Poland

to be the Curzon Line, with a digression from it some places of five
to eight kilometers in the favor of the Polish; the western frontier
should be from the town of Stettin (Poland) and in the south along the
Oder River and to remain the Neizze River in the west.

The Russians
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also felt it necessary to add some of the democratic leaders from
Polish emigre circles into the Provisional Polish Government so that
it would be recognized by the Allied Governments,

This government

should, as soon as possible, call for elections by the Polish people
for the permanent organs of the Polish government.

He finished by

stating that Mr. Harriman, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr and himself were
entrusted with the discussion of the question of enlarging the Pro
visional Polish Government and submitting their proposals to the Big
55
Three,

This ended the plenary meeting for February 7i and on

February 8, the fifth day of the conference, the day was again
started by a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at IOjOO a, m, at
the Livadia Palace,

During this meeting, the Chiefs of Staff dis

cussed the levels of supplies of all the petroleum products in all
the war theaters, the overall review of the cargo and troop shipping
positions for the remainder of 1945, the employment of the war-weary
United States bombers against the large industrial target areas in
Germany, and the subjects to be discussed in the first United StatesSoviet Union Staff Meeting.
There was a meeting of the Foreign Ministers at noon in the
Vorontsov Villa where they discussed the world security organization,
the Yugoslavian frontiers, the Control Commission in Bulgaria and
Hungary, reparations, and Iran.
The American and Soviet Chiefs of Staff met at 3*00 in the
55
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Yusupov Palace,

The persons present were Admiral Leahy, General

Marshal, Admiral King, Kuter, Antonov, Khudyakov, and Kuznetson,
The subject of this meeting was to discuss the military problems in
the Far East,

This was done in a series of questions and answers to

which Antonov stated that he had no authority to give definite answers
or promises without referring them to Stalin, but that he would give
his own opinion.

During the discussion, Antonov stated that there

were no changes in the Soviet Projection plan for the Far East from
those described by Harriman in October of 1944, that the Soviets
needed the Pacific supply route left open for the Trans-Siberian
Railroad could be knocked out, that the American help was useful
in defending Kamchatka and Eastern Siberia, that Stalin would deter
mine if a United States survey party could enter Kamchatka or not,
and that the Soviets would occupy the southern part of Sakhalin as
soon as the Japanese were defeatedj but there was no discussion on
the United States air bases in Siberia, for Antonov needed Stalin’s
approval for this.
At 3*30 p, m, in the Livadia Palace, President Roosevelt had
another meeting with Marshal Stalin j and the only others present were
Harriman, Bohlen, Molotov and Pavlov,

When they talked about the air

bases in the Far East, Stalin agreed it was all right for the United
States to have bases at Komsomolsk or at Nikalaevsk,

Stalin also

agreed to the use of airfields and survey teams to check the damage
in Eastern and Southeastern Europe and said that the United States

could use the airfields around Budapest,

President Roosevelt agreed

that the United States would sell ships to the Soviet Union after the
war was over.

In the discussions involving the Far East* Stalin said

that the Soviet Union desired concessions fcr entering the war.

The

Resident said there was nothing wrong with the Soviets getting the
southern half of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands after the wax.

He

also felt that the Russians should gain a warm water port, probably
Dairen,

Although he had not had a chance to talk with Chiang Kai-shek,

he felt that the Russians could get Dairen and certain railroad con
cessions or rights by either leasing them from the Chinese or by a
commission composed of the Chinese and Russians,

Roosevelt also

suggested the idea of making Dairen a free port under an inter
national commission, to which Stalin agreed.

President Roosevelt

then suggested the trusteeship of Korea by the United States, Soviet
Union and the Chinese until the Koreans were able to carry on selfgovernment,

They both agreed that they did not want Great Britain

in on this, for Churchill would get too upset.
Regarding the internal conditions of China, the President stated
that the United States had been working to keep her alive,

Stalin

replied that he felt China needed some new leaders around Chiang
Kai-shek,
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This ended the discussions between Roosevelt and Stalin,

for they had another plenary meeting to attend.
The fifth plenary meeting was held at ktOO p. m. at the Livadia
56
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Palace,

The first discussion topic concerned the World Security

Organization,

The Foreign Ministers read a report stating that they

had established a sub-committee to further examine the details of the
proposals and that they would report later.

In reply to Roosevelt*s

letter of February 6 to Stalin, Mr, Molotov made certain proposals
about the Polish question.

The President stated that these proposals

had been carefully studied and that there were no objections to part
one in th© Polish boundaries proposal (Eastern boundary would be the
Curzon Line with some modifications in favor of Poland); but, in
regard to point two, the United States agreed that compensation should
be given to Poland by Germany which would include East Prussia south
of Koenigsberg, Upper Silesia, and up to the Oder River, but he felt
there was little justification in the proposed expansion of the western
boundary up to the Neisse River,
The President*s reactions to the Soviet-proposed ideas concerning
the Polish government were that he wanted to form a Presidential Com
mittee of three men, possibly consisting of Mr. Bierut, Mr, Grabskl
and Archbishop Sapieha, to represent the Presidential office in the
Polish government.

This committee would undertake the task of forming

a government consisting of representative leaders from the present
Polish Provisional Government in Warsaw along with other democratic
leaders from inside Poland and abroad.

This government would b©

pledged to the concept of holding free elections in Poland as soon as
there were favorable conditions, and of forming a Constituent Assembly
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to draft a new Polish Constitution under which a permanent government
would be elected, Roosevelt finished by stating that when the Polish
Government of Rational Unity was formed, the three governments would
recognise it as the Provisional Government of Poland*
Churchill then delivered the British proposals for Poland,

He

agreed with the Curzon Line with slight adjustments for the eastern
border, while, in the west, Poland would include Danzig, the regions
of East Prussia, west and south of Koenigsberg, the district of Oppeln
in Silesia and the lands desired by Poland to the east of the Oder
River,

Churchill added that all the Germans in this area were to be

repatriated to Germany, and all the Poles in Germany, in they wished,
would be repatriated to Poland,

He wanted a fully representative pro

visional government based on all the democratic and anti-Fascist
farces in Poland, including democratic leaders from abroad.

These

representative leaders should consult each other on the makeup of the
provisional government* and V, M, Molotov, Mr, Harriman and Sir Archi
bald Clark Kerr should talk with these people and submit their con
clusions for the consideration of the Big Three,

Also, as soon as

possible, the provisional Polish government would hold "free and un
fettered" elections based on universal suffrage and the secret ballot,
with all democratic parties having the right of participating,^
Molotov wanted the Lublin government to be recognized and their
57
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leaders included in the new government, plus the Soviet concept of
Poland's-.western "boundary.

He agreed on the methods by which the

Poles should hold their elections,

Stalin merely wanted to enlarge

the present Lublin government instead of establishing a new one,
i
Then Churchill suggested that the Foreign Ministers meet every
three months in order to keep everyone well informed about changing
conditions*

All three leaders agreed to this and decided that the

first meeting should be. held in London,
Stalin wanted to know about Yugoslavia and Greece,

Prime

Minister Churchill informed him that Tito was to be the Premier,
Dr, Ivan Subasitch was to be his Foreign Minister, and the King was
to form a new government.

In Greece, Churchill was afraid that all

the different factions would not be represented, for they had not
learned to have necessary discussions and cooperate.

The meeting was

then adjourned, and at 9*00 p, in, that evening there was a big dinner
at the Yusupov Palace with the Soviets as the host.

The meal included

twenty-five courses, forty-five toasts, and lasted until after midnight.
The conversation was general} thus, no business was carried on.^

The

late hours kept at this meeting were nothing new to the Soviets,

Stalin

told President Roosevelt on February k that he and his staff followed
the custom of working all night until 5*00 a, m., sleeping until
10s00 a, m,, and then resuming work again.
this seven days a week.^
59Xbid., p. 115,
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He reported that they did

52

At 11s00 the next morning, February 9» the sixth day of the
conference, the Combined Chiefs of Staff held their meeting,

This

was a meeting consisting of both the United States and the British,
The discussions covered the drafting of the final report to President
Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill which included the American
remarks that they appreciated the help of the British Chiefs of
Staff,

At noon, this group met with the President and the Prime

Minister, reporting that in conjunction with the Russian and other
Allies, they sought to bring Germany and Japan to an "unconditional
surrender” at the earliest possible date.^
Also at noon, there was a meeting of the Foreign Ministers
at the Livadia Palace,

The-points which were still before them

involved the Dumbarton Oaks matters and the report by the sub-committee
on the form of the invitations and some other details for the arrange
ments of the United Nations Conference to be held in the near future.
They also had to consider the questions of reparations, Poland, Iran,
and those dealing with the Yugoslav frontiers.

Following this, there

was a meeting of the American and Soviet Chiefs of Staff at 3*30 p, m,f
which was also held at the Livadia Palace,

They talked over what had

been done and said at the recent meeting between tbs President and
Marshal Stalin,^
At 4:00 p, mB, the sixth plenary meeting got underway, with
State Department, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp, 827-33.
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Molotov presenting a new idea for the Polish problem#

He stated

that the Lublin government should be reorganized with the inclusion
of the democratic leaders from Poland itself and those abroad#

He

also agreed that the new government would pledge to hold free elec
tions so that the government should be recognized*

The Big Three

then decided to exchange ambassadors•in order to be informed about
the internal conditions of Poland arid to keep track on how things
*
63
were going.

The Big Three also decided on the '‘British Revised Formula
on Poland#"

This Formula read?
A new situation has been created by the
complete liberation of Poland by the Red Army,
This calls for the establishment of a Pro
visional Polish Government more broadly based
than was possible before the recent liberation
of western Poland# The Provisions,1 Government
now functioning in Poland should be reorganized
on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion
of democratic leaders from Poland itself and
from those living abroad. This new government
will then be called the Polish Provisional
Government of National Unity# Mr. Molotov,
Mr. Harriman and Sir Clark Kerr, are authorized
to consult in the first instance in Moscow with
members of the present provisional government
and with other democratic leaders from within
Poland and from abroad with a view to the re
organization of the present government along the
above lines. This Polish Provisional Government
of National Unity would be pledged to the holding
of free and unfettered elections as soon as prac
ticable on the basis of universal suffrage and
secret ballot, In these elections all democratic

Winston Churchill, The Second World War (6 vols,, Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1-9^8).» P« 925*
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and anti-Nazi parties would have the right
to take part and to put forth candidates.
When a Polish Provisional Government of
National Unity has teen properly formed in
conformity with the above, the three governments will then accord it recognition»®4
The Foreign Ministers were in disagreement on the section
where the ambassadors from each country would stay in Warsaw to see
that the elections were actually "free and unfettered,” so they
left this to-be decided by the three governments at the next plenary
meetinge
Following the meeting, a tripartite meeting was held for
drafting the.agreements regarding liberated prisoners of war and
civilians.

This was held at the Vorontsov Villa at 4*30 p, m,, and

those present were Deane, Page, Archer and Novikov,

At 10*30 p. m,

that same evening, the Foreign Ministers had another meeting in the
Yusupov Palace.

Their subject dealt with Poland and the Declaration

on Liberated Areas.

They talked over what had happened in the plenary

meeting that afternoon and what was said regarding decisions made on
the Polish question.
At noon the next day, February 10, the seventh day of the con
ference, the Foreign Ministers had another meeting.

They again dis

cussed Poland, the Declaration on Liberated Europe, Yugoslavia,
reparations, the communique on the Crimea Conference, the world
organization, the Austro-Yugoslav frontier, the Yugoslav-Italian
Stettinius, Roosevelt and the .Russians, pp. 247-48,
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frontier, the Yugoslav-Bulgarian frontier, and Iran,
The seventh plenary meeting was held at *fs00 p, m, at the
Livadia Palace.

President Roosevelt stated that he wanted to pro

pose a small amendment to the paragraph dealing with the frontiers
of Poland because of the American Constitution.

Thus, the first

words were changed to "The Three Heads of Government," instead of
"The Three Powersj" and in the second sentence he wanted to sub&*■>
stitute the word "feel" for "agree."
Another argument started
over German reparations.

Both President Roosevelt and Prime Minister

Churchill refused to have a stated amount in the papers, not even ii*
the unpublished ones,

Stalin stated that he wanted two decisions.

One, that it was agreed that in principle Germany should pay repara
tions, and second, that the Reparations Commission scheduled to sit
at Moscow should fix the amount and take into consideration the
American-Soviet proposal that there should be a total of twenty
billion dollars with fifty per cent going to the Soviet Union.

The

British still felt committed by the mentioning of a specific amount,
and Roosevelt did not like the word "reparations," for in America one
might think this meant money only.

At this time, Harry Hopkins passed

the President a note which stated:
The Russians have given in so much at this
conference that I don*t think we should let
them down. Let the British disagree if they
want to and continue their disagreement at
Moscow, Simply say it is all referred to the
.

p . 721.
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Reparations Comission with the minutes to
show the British disagree about any mention
of the ten b i l l i o n , 7
Next, the subject of the French obtaining an occupation zone
was discussed*

The President finally agreed with Churchill that the

French should be given a zone and a position on the control commission.
Surprisingly, Stalin agreed, too.

Stettinius stated that "the President

never told me just how and when he had persuaded Stalin to make this
6?
major concession which was announced so suddenly," ' Stalin also
agreed that the Tito-Subasitch agreement should go immediately into
force and that the members of the Skupschina (the last Yugoslav Legis
lature ) who had not collaborated with the Germans could be included into
the Vetch (the Anti-Fascist Association of National Liberation).

Marshal

Stalin added that he agreed to the actions of the anti-Fascist Vetch,
and they would be subject to the confirmation by the Constituent Assem,, 68
bly.
The discussion then turned to the Montreux Convention,

Stalin

wanted the first meeting of the Foreign Ministers, after the Crimea
Conference, to consider revising the idea that the Dardanelles could
be shut down, not only in a time of war but when they felt there was a
threat of war.

This was agreed on by the Big Three,

66
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Just before the conference ended, President Roosevelt announced
that he would have to leave Yalta by 31OG p. m. the next day.

Thus,

a drafting committee prepared the Conference’s Communique for signing
by the Big Three.

That evening Prime Minister Churchill gave a dinner.

The final day of the conference, February 11, the eighth plenary
meeting was held in the Livadia Palace at noon.

The Communique was

discussed} the Soviets suggested that no mention be made of the voting
procedure that Roosevelt had proposed, aid this was agreed on.
There was a final Tripartite luncheon meeting held at 1:00 p. m.
in the Livadia Palace,
signed.

The delegations had lunch, and the papers were

At ^:20 p. i,, the Foreign Ministers held their last meeting

to approve the summary of the. proceedings of the conference.
The night of the ilth, the President spent at Sevastopal.

The

next morning he drove to the airport and took a flight to Egypt where
he boarded a cruiser in the Great Bitter lake (on the Suez Canal),
On the 13th, he entertained King Farouk of Egypt and Emperor Haile
Selassie of Ethiopia.

On the l^th, the President had a luncheon for

King Ibn Saud of Saudia Arabia,

The following day he arrived at

Alexandria and had a talk with Churchill and John Wlnani,

He then

left for Algiers where he had a discussion with Kirk, Caffery and
Hewitt.

On the 19th* the President’s ship passed through the Gibraltar

Strait where the ship detected the activity of submarines.

The follow

ing day, the 20 th, Major General Edwin M. Hats on, who was the Secretary

69Department of State, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, p. 931.
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and aid to the President, died at sea.

On the 2?th, the ship put in

at an East-Coast port, and the President arrived in Washington by
social train on February 28.
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The major decisions at Yalta fall into three categories i

those

dealing with the United Nations, those regarding Europe, and those
involving the Fax East.* In the first category, Stalin did not want
certain nations to be admitted to the General Assembly because they
did not have diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union,

President

Roosevelt replied that they did help the Allies by supplying them with
raw materials.

The Big Three finally agreed that they would accept

any nation that declared war against Germany by March 1, 1945.
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Byrnes felt that the United States should have more than one
vote if the Soviets had three.

Stalin agreed on this in a note

answering Roosevelt's suggestion of February 10, but in a cable from
Hopkins to Byrnes after they left the conference, Hopkins said there
was no mention of this in the Official Communique and that It should
not be discussed even in private,

It was also reported that the

President never wanted to talk about it, and the subject was never
to be mentioned again.
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President Roosevelt was also reported as

saying that the colonial system meant war and that he was against
^New York Times, March 1, 1945.
71
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^Ibid., p. 41,
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that.

When the United Nations was established, there would be no

need for spheres of influence.

73

Later, Churchill informed Roose

velt that he believed that the President was attempting to destroy
the British Empire, and Churchill stated that the Empire meant to
hold its own.'
The category of the European decisions can be broken dorm into
two separate parts, Germany and Poland.

Stalin, who wanted a set

figure in regard to German reparations, felt that President Roose
velt had sided with the British; and he was upset.

But, when the

final protocol came out, the figures were included which showed that
Roosevelt had sided with Stalin and left Britain dissenting.

7*5

The

Soviets also wanted to exact the German reparations by the withr

drawal of factories, machinery, machine tools, railways, investments
in foreign enterprises, and a cut of the German industry by eighty
per cent.

The payments were to be made annually for ten years and

were to go only to those countries that either lost or had damages
to factories, land, homes and personal property.

The countries*

priority was established on the basis of their help in the winning
■v *

of the war and the value of their direct material losses.

Thus, the

Soviet Union was to get half of the total reparations, which made its
portion ten billibn dollars.

This was also a decision made in favor
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of the Soviets.

The "Declaration on Liberated Europe” provided for

"free and unfettered elections" for the liberated nations;
was a concession by the Soviets.

this

Another concession made by Stalin

was in regard to the French obtaining a zone of occupation in Germany.
Stalin did not feel the French should have anything to do with German
territory because of their inability to contribute during the war.
But he did let them have a zone, which was allotted by the United
States and Great Britain,

He also agreed to let the French have a

part in the Allied Control Council.

McNeill states*

One reason why the German question was
handled so unsatisfactorily at Yalta was the
pressure of other business. American atten
tion was focused primarily upon the United
Nations Organization; and the problem of
Poland usurped an entirely disproportionate
amount of time.77
The other section from the agreements regarding Europe was in
relation to Poland.

President Roosevelt suggested that the Soviets

leave out the Lwow area with its oil fields and use the Lwow line, but
Stalin wanted the boundary extended to the Neisse River and the Lublin
Committee to set up the Polish government.

Stalin got his way in most ’

of the boundary questions for Poland, but the real debate was over the
future government of Poland,

Stettinius presented a paper referring

to the Atlantic Charter principle^-the right of all peoples to choose
^Stephen Borsody, The Triumph of Tyranny (London*
p. 181.
77
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their forrisof government.

Stalin finally gave in to the American

idea for the reorganization of the Polish government and holding free
elections in a democratic method.

The President said they wanted

this to be beyond question* as pure as Caesar*s wife.

Stalin replied

that even she had some sins, and Roosevelt answered that he hoped she
had fewer than this declaration would have.

78

In a letter to Stalin,

during the conference, Roosevelt stated the exact position of the
United States and added that he was determined there would be no split
over the Polish question.

Thus, Stalin got most of what he wanted and

so did Roosevelt and Churchill.
Of the three areas of decisions at Yalta, those dealing with
the Soviets* entry into the Japanese war are the most controversial.
Stalin, in October of 1943, told Cordell Hull that the Soviets would
enter the Japanese war when Germany was defeated.
79
received this view from Stalin. * '

Harriman also

But with the intelligence reports

the War Department was receiving, it was believed the United States
needed this agreement in writing.

The United States intelligence

estimated the strength of the Japanese Army to be about 5,000,000
officers and men— 2,000,000 in Japan proper, 2,000,000 in Manchuria,
Korea, China and Formosa, and over 200,000 in Burma, Thailand and
French Indo-China, with some 500,000 in the Philippines and more than
100,000 in the bypassed Pacific Islands,
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It was a common belief
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World, January, 1949, p. 14,
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among many high-ranking American officials that the Japanese would
81
fight to the ’’last ditch."

A series of prepared recommendations

regarding Russia’s involvement in the Pacific War had been given to
President Roosevelt,

One such note was before the President at Yalta,

It was dated January 22, 19^5 f and it reads
The agreed over-all objective in the war
against Japan has been expressed as follows*
To force the unconditional surrender of
Japan by
(i)
Lowering the Japanese ability and will
to resist b y establishing sea blockades, con
ducting intensive air bombardment, and
destroying Japan’s naval strength,
(2; Invading and seizing objectives in
the industrial heart o f J a p a n , $ 2
Another note, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was dated January 23,
and was also given to the President at the conference.

It read*

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have been guided
by the following basic principles in working
toward the U.S.S.R, entry into the war against
Japan, Russia’s entry on as early a date as
possible consistent with her ability to engage
in offensive operations is necessary to provide
maximum assistance to our Pacific operations,83
The note went on to say that the Russians should defeat the Japanese
in Manchuria and conduct air operations against Japan proper in colla
boration with the United States Air Forces based in eastern Siberia and
cause maximum interference with the Japanese sea traffic between Japan
81

New York Times, February h, 19^5.
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and the mainland of Asia,
Roosevelt wanted the Russians in the war because he felt that
their participation in the Far East would insure their sincere co
operation in a united, peaceful world.

He had also been warned by

his Chiefs of Staff that without Soviet aid, it might cost the
Americans a million casualties to defeat Japan,

8k

Victory had to be

as quick as possible, for, as long as the Japanese continued the war,
the United States was limited in its operations in other areas of the
world.

The United States was running short on manpower resources in

the early months of 19^5» and an agreement with the Soviets would
give the added support needed for the defeat of Japan,

Thus, an

agreement was reached at Yalta whereby the Soviets were to enter the
war against Japan on the side of the Allies within two or three months
after the defeat of Germany on conditions involving territorial gains
(Sakhalin, Dairen, and Port Arthur) and concessions involving rail
roads in Manchuria to which the Chinese government had to agree,
This agreement was kept secret until 1955*
One of the sharper criticisms against the agreement is that the
United States had the atomic bomb and, thus, did not need Soviet aid.
A letter from the commanding general, who was working with the atomic
bomb project, to the Chiefs of Staff on December 30, 19kk, stated:
It is now reasonably certain that our oper
ation plans should be based on the gun type
bomb, which, it is estimated will produce the
Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe, p, 6 k l ,

6k

equivalent of a ten thousand ton TNT explo
sion. The first bomb, without a previous
full scale test which we do not believe will
be necessary should be ready about the 1st
of August, 19^5*
second one should be
ready by the end of the year and succeeding
ones at , . . intervals there after.
Our previous hopes that an implosion
type of bomb might develop in the late spring
have now been dissipated by scientific diffi
culties which we have not as yet been able
to solve. . . . We should have sufficient
material for the first implosion type bomb
sometime in the latter part of July.1
The President had been informed of this situation along with
suggestions from the State Department and War Department regarding
Russia’s entry into the war.

The first bomb was successfully

exploded in New Mexico on July 16, 19^5# but no one could say for
certain if it would work before the agreements at Yalta,

Winnacker

states that "agreements with the U.S.S.R. were . , • likely to raise

86 He was referring to

fewer problems than no agreements at all,"
the fact that what else could be done?

No one was actually sure

that the bomb would work.
Other criticisms of the Yalta agreements center around certain
individuals who were present.

Many wondered about the role of Harry

Hopkins and how much influence he actually had on the President,

It

has been reported -that Hopkins did not originate policy and then talk
the President into it,

"He made It his job to provide a sounding

board for discussion of the best means of attaining the goals that
85
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86Winnacker, "Yalta— Another Munich?", p. 531,
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Ort
the President set for himself,” { Hopkins was also reported to look
to the immediate, rather than the long-range results, and that RooseQO
velt used him as an implementer rather than as a planner.
At the
Malta Conference, Hopkins was sickj and Dr, MeIntire told him to
stay in bed.

He remined ill during the Yalta Conference, and he

stayed in bed under doctor*s orders, except for the plenary meetings.
Another person, Chester Bohlen, who was at the conference, was
the President’s personal interpreter and advisor at the conference.
He also was the United States delegation*s note-taker for the con
ference, and his work appears in the State Department’s official
record of the Yalta Conference,
Probably the most controversial person at the Conference was
Alger Hiss,

In 19^8, the House Committee on Un-American Activities

uncovered a Soviet spy ring in Washington,

A man known by Hiss as

George Crosley was a known member of the Communist Party from 1931
to 1938; from 193^ to 1937 he was in an underground organization
among the government workers.

He was reported to have received

government documents in a briefcase, to have had them microfilmed
and then returned the case and documents to his source, who would
then return the documents to the office.

Hiss knew George Crosley,

whose real name was Chambers, for at least ten months.

The two

appeared to have had a close relationship, for Hiss let Chambers use
87
'Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p, 212,
88-rv4A
:C
Ibid,, P« 5*
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his home and car,

While under oath, Chambers named Hiss as a member

of the pre-war Communist E^trty and the source for the stolen documents.
The nature of the documents was highly confidential and classified
Top Secret by the State Department,

The most important ones came

from the office of the Assistant Secretary of State, Francis B.
Sayre,

Hiss denied that he knew that Chambers was a Communist, and

he said that he himself was not one.

89

Hiss was never convicted of

being either a Communist or a spy, but he was prosecuted for perjury
and convicted and sentenced to prison in January of 1950,

The impor

tant question is, what was Hiss*s role at the Yalta Conference?
Bohlen reported to the committee in the Hiss case that "I am abso
lutely certain that Hiss never saw President Roosevelt in a capacity
of advisor to him and never had any interviews with him except that
first one when the President met the whole delegation before the

90
opening of the c o n f e r e n c e , H i s s was reported to be against the
ideas of Stalin in regard to the limitation of the great-power veto
in the United Nations, and he also felt that France and China should
be included as sponsoring nations for -the United Nations,
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The question of the President's health during the conference is
also a target for criticism of the Yalta Conference,

While the

89
House Committee on Un-American Activities, 80th Cong,, 2nd
Sess,, Washington, 19^8, p. 3*
9°Ibia.. p. 20 .
New York Times. March 18, 1955.
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President was at Hyde Bark during the Christmas season in 19^3, he
caught influenza and had acute attacks of respiratory infection
during the weeks that followed.

To reduce the strain on his heart,

Dr, MeIntire, the President’s personal physician, prescribed a gradual
reduction in weight amounting to about ten pounds.

The President took

so much pride in his flat stomach that he continued to go beyond the
dietary requirements as prescribed.

On May 10, 19^4, the President

had a full physical examination by Doctors Harper, Duncan, Dickens,
Behrens and Bruenn and was reported to be in good health,

When the

President left Washington on his trip to Yalta, he had a severe cold
and during the trip he rested often.

Dr, MeIntire states that the

President was suffering from sinus infections which made his appear
ance look bad, but he had greatly improved by the time he reached

92
Malta.'

During the conference, his doctor reported that Roosevelt

was fatigued, but there was no loss of vigor and clarity,

93

A former

executive aid to Roosevelt, Jonathan Daniels, states that it was his
job to screen the pictures taken of the President by the Army Signal
Corps at Yalta, which were to be released to the press. Some of the
gif,

photos show him marked by "deadly haggard weariness,”'

Dr, MeIntire

stated that there were also some very good photos.
When the President returned to Washington, he gave a speech in
Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p, 22,
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Congress in which he stated that during the trip he was in good
health*

About a month later, on April 12, 19^5» President Roose

velt died at Warm Springs, Georgia,

Dr, Mclntire reported that "the

President never had a stroke, never had any serious heart condition
and never underwent other operations than the removal of a wen and
96
the extraction of an infected tooth,"
heart functioned strongly to the last.

He added that the President’s
Dr, Mclntire stated that the

President died of a massive introcerebral hemorrhage which ruptured
into the subarachnoid space.

There was never an autopsy performed.

During the actual conference at Yalta, the press in America
had little information! practically everything was kept secret.

By

February 5» the press speculated that the conference was being held
somewhere in the Black Sea area and felt they knew some of the probable
issues that would be discussed.

They also felt that it was all right

to keep the meetings secret because of the military matters that
would likely be discussed.

The papers were filled with headlines

telling of the Soviet Army’s advancement across Eastern Europe and
about the retreating Germans,

The papers expressed a great faith in

President Roosevelt, and the New York Times described him as " , , ,
one of the greatest American leaders of all time and perhaps an even
higher prestige abroad than at home,"

96

On February 13» the results of the Yalta Conference were presented
96
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to Congress,*

The New York Times reported that "the Big Three

statement (papers) won "bipartisan applause today in Congress,

Both

Democrats and Republicans said that it held out high hope for future
97
peace.”7

Roosevelt felt that the Yalta agreements were a good start

toward the goal of world peace and that the conference was a turning
98
point in the war,'

The Omaha World Herald reported on February 14

that "American response to the Crimea Conference has been a feeling
of relief, an upsurge of hope for the success of international coop
eration, and a pat on the back to President'Roosevelt for a job well
99
done,”77 But there were those who looked on the conference with a
skeptical eye.

Senator Burton K, Wheeler, a Democrat from Montana,

felt that this was the greatest victory for Stalin and for Russian
imperialism.

There were supporters for both sides of the argument.

Following the surrender of Germany, May 8, 1945, another toplevel conference was held at Potsdam, near Berlin,

This meeting was

attended by Marshal Stalin, President Chiang Kai-shek, President
Harry S, Truman, and Prime Minister Clement Attlee,

During this

conference, the former European Advisory Commission was replaced by
the new Council of Foreign Ministers which represented China, Great
Britain, the Soviet Union, the United States, and France,
^Ibid., February 13, 1945.
^Wilmot, "Was Yalta a Calamity?", p. 7,
^ Omaha World Herald, February 14, 1945,
*See Appendix C,

The details
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of the control of the occupation zones in Germany were worked out
along with the reparations question.
But "before the Potsdam Conference, Hurley, the United States
Ambassador to China, was sent to Moscow to ask Stalin when Chiang
could be told of the agreements and relations started between the
Reds and the Chinese National Government could be started as pre
scribed at Yalta,

Stalin wanted to wait for about two months, and

Hurley agreed.
On August 6, 19^5, the United States dropped the atomic bomb
on Hiroshima,

Two days later, August 8, the Soviet Union declared

war on the Japanese Empire, On August 14, the Soviets and National
Chinese Government negotiated the Sino-Soviet Agreements,

The Soviets

obtained privileges in railroads and ports, but they fully recognized
the National Governments sovereignty in both China and Manchuria.*^*
In the years that f ollowed, the Soviet Union repeatedly vio
lated the Yalta Agreements.

In Bulgaria, the Soviet Government,

with the help of the local Communist Party, unilaterally subverted
the representative democratic process.

In 1945, Soviet authorities

interfered in the internal affairs of Bulgaria’s largest political
party by demanding and obtaining the replacement of Dr. G. M. Dimitrov
as the Secretary General of the Agrarian Union,

In Hungary, the

Soviets, with the help of the Hungarian Communist Party, armed forces
^^Harriman, "Our Wartime Relations with Russia," p. 375#
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in Hungary*

The Catholic Youth Organization was dissolved in June

of 19^6? Soviet armed forces arrested Bela Kovacs, who was a member
of the Parliament and the Secretary of the Smallholders Party, in
February of 19^7 S they forced the resignation of Prime Minister Nagy
102
in May, and Hungary conformed to Soviet domination by 19^7 •
In
Rumania, Premier Radscu's interim representative government was
overthrown and a Communist-controlled regime was installed from
February to March of 19^5i Premier Groza1s office remined by his
defiance of the King’s demands to resign in August5 and there were
Soviet interferences with the occupational authorities in the election campaign of 19^6 9

103

Finally, in Poland, the Polish Peasant

Party got only 28 of the W f seats in the government as a result of
Soviet activity.

On July 6 , 1950, the Soviet-controlled governments

of Poland and East Germany signed an agreement making the Oder-Neisse
line the definitive German-Polish boundary, and in 1952 the elections
were the single-slate Soviet type, and there was not even a token of
representative government permitted as the Constitution of July 22,
104
1952, was approved.
Some persons questioned the legality of the secret agreement
concerning the Soviets’ entry into the Japanese war.

Stephen Ban

states that in this document, neither the form, contents, nor
terminology stipulate when it would come into force, n o r is there
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anything said about its ratification or termination.

The document

was signed with the leaders* signatures, but without the official
titles of their respective governments.

The section regarding the

land to go to Russia was against the Sino-Soviet Agreement of 192*1*;
and, therefore, the Russian claims were questionable as to their
validity.

Pan concluded his study by stating*
In considering the Yalta Agreement as a
whole, however, its legal aspects and implica
tions deserve careful examination. This is
because this "Leaders* Agreement" was signed
in such an unusual manner, as has been pointed
out; because it assumed the acceptance by an
ally of the claims of another ally; because
it is at variance with several outstanding
international agreements such as the NinePower Treaty, the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1924,
the Atlantic Charter and the Cairo Declaration;
and because it also involves the Japanese Peace
Treaty as well as the very "validity" of the
Yalta Agreement itself. Furthermore, the con
stitutionality of the Yalta Agreement has been
raised by some members of the Senate who ques
tioned the authority of the President of the
United States of America, as a "leader" of one
of the "Three Great Powers." The questions of
ratification, duration and abrogation of this
agreement are still cloudy. Such loopholes may
lead to further legal and political complica
tions in international relations.105

When the Yalta official protocol and the secret agreement with
Russia were released in the spring of 1955» Winston Churchill stated
that he found mistakes in the United States version of what happened
at Yalta,

He was specifically referring to the unfriendly sentiments

^^Stephen Pan, "Legal Aspects of the Yalta Agreement," Journal
of International Law. XLVI (January, 1952), 59.
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attributed to him in regard to the Polish people#*^

Later, an ex-

State Department historian. Dryton Barron, charged that the Yalta
Papers were slanted by the omission of certain documents#

107

He

stated that he was the original compiler of the papers for the State
Departments he was dismissed for insubordination#

This view had been

expressed by others who feel that there might be some more secret
documents that are still unpublished, but for right now this is just
specillation, for there seems to be really nothing to substantiate
these charges#
There are m a y different theories attributed to the failure or
the breakdown of the Yalta Agreements#

Some feel that it was a con

spiracy; they feel that Roosevelt sold out half of Europe to Stalin
as the result of Communist work in the United States State Department,
a theory popularized by McCarthy,

Others, like Elliot Roosevelt,

have the idea that it failed because President Roosevelt died, for
they believe his ideals and statesmanship would have been sufficient
108
to keep the world unity during the post-war period.
Still others feel that failure at Yalta was due to an Anglo-American
antagonism.

Critics have attacked Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin, Hopkins,

Hiss, and practically everyone else connected with the conference.

The

Departments of State and War have been accused of negligence in giving
*^New York Times# March 18, 1955«
* ^ Ibld,, February 5* 1956.
^^Borsody, The Triumph of Tyranny, p# 185#
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the President Information which led- him the wrong way.
more realistic approach to the problem.

Some take a

They feel the failure of the

Yalta Agreements in the years following this important conference was
not due to the United States but that it failed because the Soviets
failed to keep their promises which were made at Yalta by the signing
of the protocol.
The Yalta documents represent one of the most controversial
issues resulting from the Second World War,

The conference was held

in secretj not even the press or press photographers were invited.
In fact, the pictures taken at Yalta were taken by members of the
American Army Signal Corps,

The official conference communique was

carefully worded, only giving the "bare essentials,"
tion, in the main, was favorable,

Immediate reac

A large number of Americans felt

that there was ’’hope," as the newspaper articles show.

But, as the

agreements reached at Yalta began to fall apart, the American public
became upset.

The McCarthy brand of "red scare" that swept through

the United States during the early 1950*s aroused the public to the
Communist threat.

When the New York Times published the "Secret

Agreements" in the spring of 1955$ Yalta again came into the lime
light,

These "secret documents" dealing with Russia’s entry into the

war revived the whole Yalta question.

The American public asked why

these had not been released in 19*t5«

The fact of the matter is that

there was never any official Congressional approval or full knowledge
of what happened at Yalta,

James Byrnes asked President Roosevelt
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about the secret documents, wondering if they would be put into the
form of a treaty,

Roosevelt replied that this would be embodied in

an eventual peace treaty,

109

Roosevelt also suggested Congressional action.

In his report

to Congress on March 1, 19^5» the President stated*
Speaking in all frankness, the question of
whether it is fruitful or not, lies, to a
great extent, in your hands, for unless you,
here in the Halls of the American Congress,
concur in the general conclusions reached at
the place called Yalta, and give them your
active support, the meeting will not have
produced lasting results. And that is why
I have come before you at the earliest hour
I could after my return, H O
President Roosevelt died soon after, and the Yalta Papers never
did come officially before Congress for approval,

Whether the Presi

dent really intended to do this is a question that cannot be answered.
To complicate matters, there is no official peace treaty with Germany
and Italy,

The War Conferences serve in its place, especially Yalta,

The United States was bound to these agreements by President Roose
velt’s use of the executive agreement.
The President has the right to enter into executive agreements
as Commander-in-Chief for military agreements; and, because of his power
over foreign relations (that is, chief diplomat), he can enter into
political agreements without the advice and consent of the Congress,
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Although the Constitution does not specifically authorize the Presi
dent to be the director-in-chief of foreign affairs or grant the
power of executive agreements, he may make treaties contingent upon
the approval of the Senate.

Thus, by implied and/or expanded powers,

President Roosevelt was able to use successfully the executive agree
ment.

In 1953, Senator Bricker attempted to challenge this executive

power by sponsoring a proposed Constitutional amendment.

This amend

ment, if passed, would require Congressional approval of executive
agreements.

The Bricker Amendment failed, as did its "watered-down"

substitute on February 26, 195^.
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With regard to President Roosevelt and the conferences from the
Atlantic Charter to Yalta, Congress played a very small role, either
as a critic or as a participant,

Roland Young sums up the role of

Congress in this list of conferences by stating:
Congress did not participate in these
military and military-political conferences.
It was not invited, and it did not ask to be
invited; Congress seemed to consider that
the prerogative of making commitments at
.._
such conferences belonged to the President . . .
The Congress, along with the American public, was accustomed to
President Roosevelt’s full use of his presidential powers.

This pattern

started during the Depression and continued throughout Roosevelt’s
almost four complete administrations.

Each conference, the Atlantic

111
York:

Thomas Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968), p. 828.

112
Roland Young, Congressional Politics in the Second World War
(New York: Columbia University Press,1956), p. 1^7.

77

Charter, the Casablanca Conference, the Moscow and Teheran Conference,
mark the way to Yalta, almost like stepping stones a-cross a creek.
Thus, by the use of the executive agreement and thetopics discussed
during the pre-Yalta conferences, the Crimea Conference was the cul
mination of the military, military-political agreements already made.
President Roosevelt had become accustomed to using the executive agree
ment backed by his justification that he expected an "official” peace
treaty to mark the end of World War II.

It is interesting to note

that after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt liked being referred
to as Commander-in-chief, rather than President,

113

The question soon arose as to how long the United States was
obligated to adhere to the Yalta agreements,

Stephen Pan feels that

after Roosevelt,s death, with a new administration taking office,
" , , , the United States could legally consider itself no longer
Hk
bound by the various Yalta understandings.
President Truman
stated on April 23, 19^5» that ” . . . if one part of the agreements
which they /the Soviet Union/ had entered with President Roosevelt at
Yalta were breached, he would consider that the entire Yalta Agreement
was no longer binding on any of the parties interested.”* ^
The discontinued adherence to the Yalta Agreements also became
a part of the Republican political platform of 1952.
113
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The executive agreement had been used many times before the
Yalta Conference, and by Presidents before Roosevelt; and it will
certainly be used in the future.

But it is doubtful whether it

will ever create the controversy that the Yalta Conference did.
This conference bound the United States, at least for a time, to
many very important agreements.

Many historians view the breakdown

of the Yalta Agreements as one of the basic causes of the "cold war,"
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APPENDIX A
PROTOCOL OF THE PROCEEDINGS
OF THE CRIMEA CONFERENCE
The Crimea Conference of the Heads of the Governments of the
United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics which took place from February 4th to ilth came
to the following conclusionss
1.

WORLD ORGANIZATION
It was decided*
(1) that a United Nations Conference on the proposed world

organization should be summoned for Wednesday, 25th April, 1945, and
should be held in the United States of America*
(2) the Nations to be invited to this Conference should be*
(a) the United Nations as they existed on the 8th
February, 1945, and
(b) such of the Associated Nations as have declared war
on the common enemy by 1st March, 1945.

(For this purpose by the

term "Associated Nation" was meant the eight Associated Nations and
Turkey.)

When the Conference on World Organization is held, the

delegates of the United Kingdom and United States of America will
support a proposal to admit to original membership two Soviet
Socialist Republics, I.e., the Ukraine and White Russia,
(3) that the United States Government on behalf of Three Powers
should consult the Government of China and the French Provisional
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Government in regard to the decisions taken at the present Conference
concerning the proposed World Organisation,
(^) that the text of the invitation to he issued to all the
nations which would take part in the United Nations Conference should
he as follows*
INVITATION
"The Government of the United States of America, on hehalf of
itself and of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China and of the Pro
visional Government of the French Republic, invite the Government of
______ _ to send representatives to a Conference of the
United Nations to be held on 25th April, 19^5» or soon thereafter,
at San Francisco in the United States of America to prepare a Charter
for a General International Organization for the maintenance of inter
national peace and security,
"The above named governments suggest that the Conference consider
as affording a basis for such a Charter the Proposals for the Establish
ment of a General International Organization, which were made public
last October as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, and which
have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C
of Chapter VI*
,MC. Voting
'i. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote,
*2, Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters
should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members,
*3, Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters
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should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the
concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions
under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of para
graph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should
abstain from voting.*
"Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted sub
sequently,
"In the event that the Government o f

______

desires

in advance of the Conference to present views or comments concerning
the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be
pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating
Governments,"
TERRITORIAL TRUSTEESHIP
It was agreed that the five Nations which will have permanent
seats on ihe Security Council should consult each other prior to the
United Nations Conference on the question of territorial trusteeship.
The acceptance of this recommendation is subject to its being made
clear that territorial trusteeship will only apply to (a) existing man
dates of the League of Nations; (b) territories detached from the enemy
as a result of the present war; (c) any other territory which might
voluntarily be placed under trusteeship; and (d) no discussion of
actual territories is contemplated at the forthcoming United Nations
Conference or in the preliminary consultations and it will be a matter
for subsequent agreement which territories within the above categories
will be placed under trusteeship.
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ii.

DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE
The following declaration has "been approved*
"The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the

Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United
States of America have consulted with each other in the common inter
ests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe,
They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the
temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of
their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the
domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite
states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political
and economic problems,
"The establishment of order in Europe and the re-building of
national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable
the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and
Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice.
This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter— the right of all peoples
to choose the form of government under which they will live— the
restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples
who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations,
"To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may
exercise these ri^its, the three governments

will jointly assist

the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite
state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require (a) to
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establish.'conditions'of internal peacej (b) to carry out emergency
measures for the relief of distressed peoples? (c) to form interim
governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic
elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible
establishment through free elections of governments responsive to
the will of the people? and (d) to facilitate where necessary the
holding of such elections.
"The three governments will consult the other United Nations
and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when
matters of direct interest to them are under consideration,
"When* in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in
any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in
Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult
together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsi
bilities set forth in this declaration,
"By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles
of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United
Nations, and our determination to build in co-operation with other
peaceloving nations world order under law, dedicated to peace, security,
freedom and general well-being of all mankind,
"In issuing this declaration, the Three Powers express the hope
that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be asso
ciated with them in the procedure suggested."
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tile DISMEMBERMENT OF GERMANY
It was agreed that Article 12 (a) of the Surrender Terras for
Germany should he amended to read as followsi
"The United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics shall possess supreme authority with
respect to Germany.

In the exercise of such authority they will take

such steps, including the complete disarmament, demilitarisation and
the dismemberment of Germany as they deem requisite for future peace
and security."
The study of the procedure for the dismemberment of Germany was
referred to a Committee, consisting of Mr. Eden (Chairman), Mr, Winant
and Mr, Gousev,

This body would consider the desirability of asso

ciating with it a French representative,
IV.

ZONE OF OCCUPATION FOR THE FRENCH AND CONTROL COUNCIL FOR GERMANY,
It was agreed that a zone in Germany, to be occupied by the

French Forces, should be allocated to France.

This zone would be

formed out of the British and American zones and its extent would be
settled by the British and Americans in consultation with the French
Provisional Government.
It was also agreed that the French Provisional Government should
be invited to become a member of the Allied Control Council for Germany,
V.

REPARATION
The following protocol has been approvedi
1.

Germany must pay in kind for the losses caused by her to the
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Allied nations in the course of the war.

Repara,tions are to be

received in the first instance by those countries which have borne
the main burden of the war, have suffered the heaviest losses and
have organised victory over the enemy,

2.

Reparation in kind is to be exacted from Germany in three

following formst
(a) Removals within 2 years from the surrender of Germany or
the cessation of organised resistance from the national wealth of
Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as out
side her territory (equipment, machine-tools, ships, rolling stock,
German investments abroad, shares of industrial, transport and other
enterprises in Germany, etc.), these removals to be carried out
chiefly for purpose of destroying the war potential of Germany,
(b) Annual deliveries of goods from current production for a
period to be fixed,
(c) Use of German labour,
3.

For the working out on the above principles of a detailed

plan for exaction of reparation from Germany an Allied Reparation
Commission will be set up in Moscow,

It will consist of three rep

resentatives— one from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, one
ftom the United Kingdom and one from the United States of America,
4.

With regard to the fixing of the total sum of the reparation

as well as the distribution of it among the countries which suffered
from the German aggression the Soviet and American delegations agreed
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as follows*
"The Moscow Reparation Commission should take in its initial
studies as a "basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet
Government that the sum of the reparation in accordance with the
points (a) and (b) of the paragraphs should be 20 billion dollars
and that 50^ of it should go to the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics."
The British delegation was of the opinion that pending con
sideration of the reparation question by the Moscow Reparation
Commission no figures of reparation should be mentioned.
The above Soviet-American proposal has been passed to the
Moscow Reparation Commission as one of the proposals to be considered
the Commission.
V!.

MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS
The Conference agreed that the question of the major war

criminals should be the subject of enquiry by the three Foreign
Secretaries for report in due course after the close of the Conference.
Vli.

POLAND
The following Declaration on Poland was agreed by the Conference.
"A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her

complete liberation by the Red Army.

This calls for the establishment

of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than
was possible before the recent liberation of the Wester part of Poland,
The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should

8?

therefore be reorganised on a broader democratic basis with the
inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles
abroad.

This new Government should then be called the Polish Pro

visional Government of National Unity,
"M, Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized
as a commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with
members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish
democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view
to the reorganisation of the present Government along the above lines.
This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged
to the holding of free and Unfettered elections as soon as possible
on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot.

In these elec

tions all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to
take part and to put forward candidates,
"When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been
properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the
U.S.S.R,, which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present
Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United
Kingdom and the Government of the U.S.A. will establish diplomatic
relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity,
and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Govern
ments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland,
"The three Heads of Government consider that the Eastern frontier
of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in
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some regions of five to eight kilometres in favour of Poland.

They

recognise that Poland must receive substantial accessions of terri
tory in the North and West.

They feel that the opinion of the new

Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in
due. course in the extent of 111636 accessions and that the final
delimitation of the Western frontier of Poland should thereafter
await the Peace Conference.11
Vill.

YUGOSLAVIA
It was agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and to Dr. Subasic:
(a) that the Tito-Subasic Agreement should immediately be put

into effect and a new Government formed on the basis of the Agreement,
(b) that as soon as the new Government has been formed it should
declare t

CD that the Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation
(AUNOJ) will be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav
Skupstina who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with
the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary Parliament and
(ii) that legislative acts -passed by the Anti-Fascist
Assembly of National Liberation (AUNOJ) will be subject to subsequent
ratification by a Constituent Assembly?
and that this statement should be published in the communique of the
Conference•
IX.

ITALO-YUGOSLAV FRONTIER
ITALO-AUSTRIA FRONTIER
Notes on these subjects were put In by the British delegation and
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the American and Soviet delegations agreed to consider them and give
their views later,
X,

YUGOSLAV~BULGARIAN RELATIONS
There was an exchange of views between the Foreign Secretaries

on the question of the desirability of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact of
alliance.

The question at issue was whether a state still under an

armistice regime could be allowed to enter into a treaty with another
state.

Mr. Eden suggested that the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments

should be informed that this could not be approved,

Mr. Stettinius

suggested that the British and American Ambassadors should discuss
the matter further with Mr. Molotov in Moscow,

Mr. Molotov agreed

with the proposal of Mr. Stettinius.
XI.

SOUTH EASTERN EUROIE
The British Delegation put in notes for the consideration of

their colleagues on the following subjects:
(a) the Control Commission in Bulgaria
(b) Greek claims upon Bulgaria, more particularly with reference
to reparations.
(c) oil equipment in Roumania.,
Xii.

IRAN
Mr. Eden, Mr. Stettinius and M. Molotov exchanged views on the

situation in Iran,

It was agreed that this matter should be pursued

through the diplomatic channel.
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XIII,

MEETINGS OP THE THREE FOREIGN SECRETARIES
The Conference agreed that permanent machinery should be set up

for consultation between the three Foreign Secretaries? they should
meet as often as necessary, probably about every three or four months.
These meetings will be held in rotation in the three capitals,
the first meeting being held in London,
XIV.

THE MONTREUX CONVENTION AND THE STRAITS
It was agreed that at the next meeting of the three Foreign

Secretaries to be held in London, they should consider proposals
which it was understood the Soviet Government would put forward in
relation to the Montreux Convention and report to their Governments,
The Turkish Government should be informed at the appropriate moment.
The foregoing Protocol was approved and signed by the three
Foreign Secretaries at the Crimea Conference, February 11, i$&5.
E R Stettinius, Jr
B , Mojiotob
Anthony Eden
Part V. on Reparations occurs in the official State Department,
The Conference at Malta and Yalta, (Washington 1955) » 932-3» as an
added portion titled PROTOCOL ON THE TALKS BETWEEN THE HEADS OF THE
THREE GOVERNMENTS AT THE CRIMEAN CONFERENCE ON THE QUESTION OF THE
GERMAN REPARATION IN KIND, which was signed by Churchill, Roosevelt
and Stalin (Ctajihh) and dated also as February 11, 19^5#
same wording as appeared above under part V,"

116

116
Department of State, op. cit,, 9?5~83«

This is the
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APPENDIX B
MAGREEMENT REGARDING ENTRY OF THE SOVIET
UNION INTO THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN, TOP SECRET”
AGREEMENT
The leaders of the three Great Powers— the Soviet Union, the
United States of America and Great Britain— have agreed that in two
or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe
has terminated the Soviet Union shall enter into the war against
Japan on the side of the Allies on condition thats
Xc

The status quo in Outer-Mongolia (The Mongolian People's

Republic) shall be preserved;
2.

The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous

attack of Japan in 190^ shall be restored, viz*
(a) the southern part of Sakhalin as well asall the
islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union,
(b) the commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized,
the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safe
guarded and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base ofthe USSR
restored,
(c) the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South-Manchurian
Railroad which provides an outlet to Dairen shall be jointly operated
by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese Company, it being under
stood that the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be
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safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria,
3.

The Kurile Islands shall he handed over to the Soviet Union,

It is understood that -the agreement concerning Outer-Mongolia
and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence
of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek,

The President will take measures in

order to obtain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin,
The Heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims
of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has
been defeated.
For its part the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to conclude
with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance
between the USSR and China in order to render assistance to China with
its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese
yoke,
i/i Ctajihh
Franklin D Roosevelt
Winston S Churchill117
February ii, 19^5
"^Department of State, op, cit,,
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APPENDIX 0
"THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY"
We have considered and determined the military plans of the
three Allied powers for the final defeat of the common enemy.

The

military staffs of the three Allied nations have met in daily
meetings throughout the conference.

These meetings have been most

satisfactory from every point of view and have resulted in closer
coordination of the military effort of the three Allied powers than
ever before.

The fullest information has been interchanged.

The

timing, scope, and coordination of new and even more powerful blows
to be launched by our armies and air forces into the heart of Germany
from the east, west, north, and south have been fully agreed and
planned in detail.
Our combined military plans will be made known only as we
execute them, but we believe that the very close working partnership
among the three staffs attained at this conference will result in
shortening the war.

Meetings of the three staffs will be continued

in the future whenever the need arises,
Nazi Germany is doomed.

The German people will only make the

cost of their defeat heavier to themselves by attempting to continue
a hopeless resistance,
THE OCCUPATION AND CONTROL OF GERMANY ''
We have agreed on common policies and plans for enforcing the
unconditional surrender terms which we. shall impose together on Nazi

Germany after German armed resistance has been finally crushed.
These terms will not be made known until the final defeat of Germany
has been accomplished.

Under the agreed plan, the forces of the three

powers will each occupy a separate zone of Germany.

Coordinated admini

stration and control has been provided for under the plan through a
central control commission consisting of the supreme commanders of
the three powers with headquarters in Berlin,

It has been agreed

that France should be invited by the three powers, if she should so
desire, to take over a zone of occupation, and to participate as a
fourth member of the control commission.

The limits of the French

zone will be agreed by the four governments concerned through their
representatives on the European Advisory Commission,
It is our inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and
Nazi-ism and to insure that Germany will never again be able to dis
turb the peace of the world.

Vie are determined to disarm and disband

all German armed forces; break up for all time the German General Staff
that has repeatedly contrived the resurgence of German militarism;
remove or destroy all German military equipment; eliminate or control
all German industry that could be used far military production; bring
all wax criminals to just and swift punishment, and exact reparations
in kind for the destruction wrought by the Germans; wipe out the Nazi
Party, Nazi laws, organizations, and institutions; remove all Nazi and
militarist influences from public office and from the cultural and
economic life of the German people; and take in harmony such other
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measures in Germany as may be necessary to the future peace and
safety of the world.

It is not our purpose to destroy the people

of Germany, but only when Nazi-ism and militarism have been extir
pated will there be hope for a decent life for Germans, and a place
for them in the comity of nations,
REPARATION BY GERMANY
We have considered the question of the damage caused by Germany
to the Allied Nations in this war and recognized it as just that Ger
many be obliged to make compensation for this damage in kind to the
greatest extent possible,
damage will be established.

A commission for the compensation of
The commission will be instructed to

consider the question of the extent and methods for compensating
damage caused by Germany to the Allied countries.

The commission

will work in Moscow,
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE
We are resolved upon the earliest possible establishment with
our allies of a general international organisation to maintain peace
and security.

We believe that this is essential, both to prevent

aggression and to remove the political, economic, and social causes
of war through the close and continuing collaboration of all peaceloving peoples.
The foundations were laid at Dumbarton Oaks,

On -the important

question of voting procedure, however, agreement was not there reached.
The present conference has been able to resolve this difficulty.
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We have agreed that a conference of United Nations should he
called to meet at San Rranciseo in the United States on April 25»
19^5, to prepare the charter of such an organisation, along the
lines proposed in the informal conversations at Dumbarton Oaks,
The Government of China and the Provisional Government of Prance
Kill he immediately consulted and invited to sponsor invitations to
the conference jointly with the Governments of the United States,
Great Britain, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

As

soon as the consultation with China and Prance has been completed,
Hie text of the proposals on voting procedure will be made public,
DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE
The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and the President of the United
States of America have consulted with each other in the common inter
ests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe,
They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the
temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of
their three Governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the
domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite
states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political
and economic problems.
The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of
national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable
the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of naziism and
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fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice,
This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter— the right of all peoples
to choose the form of government under which they will live““the
restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples
who. have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.
To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may
exercise these rights, the three Governments will jointly assist the
people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state
in Europe where in their judgment conditions require (a) to establish
conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures
for the relief of distressed peoples; (c) to form interim governmental
authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the
population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through
free elections of government responsive to the will of the people;
and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.
The three Governments will consult the other United Nations and
provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters
of direct interest to them are under consideration.
When, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in any
European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe
make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together
on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set
forth in this declaration.
By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of
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the Atlantic Charier, om: pledge in the declaration "by the United
Nations, and our determination to build in cooperation with other
peace-loving nations world order under law, dedicated to peace,
security, freedom., and general well-being of all mankind.
In issuing this declaration, the three powers express the
hoj>e that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may
be associated with them in the procedure suggested,
POLAND

A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her
complete liberation by the Red Array,

This calls for the establish

ment of a Polish provisional government whiGh can be more broadly
based than was possible before the recent liberation of western
Poland,

The provisional government which is now functioning in

Poland should, therefore, be recognized on a broader democratic
basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and
from Poles abroad.

This new government should then be called the

Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.
M, Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A, Clark.Kerr are authorized
as a commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with mem
bers of the present provisional government and with other Polish
democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view
to the reorganization of the present government along the above lines.
This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged
to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on

99

the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot.

In these elec

tions all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to
take part and put forward candidates.
When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been
properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the
U.S.S.R, which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present
provisional government of Poland, and the Government of the United
Kingdom and the Government of the United States of America will
establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional
Government of National Unity, and will exchange ambassadors by whose
reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the
situation in Poland.
The three heads of government consider that the eastern fron
tier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from
It in some regions of 5 to 8 kilometers in favor of Poland,

They

recognize that Poland must receive substantial accessions to terri
tory in the north and west.

They feel that the opinion of the new

Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in
due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final
delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter
await the peace conference,
YUGOSLAVIA
We have agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic
that the agreement between them should be put into effect immediately,
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and that a new government should he formed on the basis of that
agreement.
He also recommend that as soon as the new government has been
formed it should declare that:
(1) The Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation should be
extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Parliament who have
not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus
forming a body to be known as a temporary parliament! and
(2) Legislative acts passed by the Anti-Fascist Assembly of
National Liberation will be subject to subsequent ratification by a
constituent assembly,
There was also a general review of other Balkan questions,
MEETINGS OF FOREIGN SECRETARIES
Throughout the conference, besides the daily meetings of the
heads of governments and the foreign secretaries, separate meetings
of the three foreign secretaries and their advisors have also been
held daily.
These meetings have proved of ihe utmost value and the Confer
ence agreed that permanent machinery should be set up for regular
consultation between the three Foreign Secretaries,

They will,

therefore, meet as often as may be necessary, probably about every
3 or 4 months,

These meetings will be held in rotation in the -three

capitals, the first meeting being held in London, after the United
Nations Conference on NorId Organization,
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UNITY FOR PEACE AS FOR WAR
Our meeting here in the Crimea has reaffirmed our common
determination to maintain and strengthen in the peace to come that
unity of purpose and of action which has made victory possible and
certain for the United Nations in this war.

We believe that this is

a sacred obligation which our governments owe to our peoples and to
all the peoples of the world.
Only with the continuing and growing cooperation and under
standing among our three countries and among all the peace-loving
nations can be the highest aspiration of humanity be realized— a
secure and lasting peace which will, in the words of the Atlantic
Charter, "afford assurance that all the men in all the lands nay
live out their lives in freedom from fear and want,”
Victory in this war and establishment of the proposed inter
national organization will provide the greatest opportunity in all
history to create in the years to come the essential conditions of
such a peace,
Winston S Churchill
Franklin D Roosevelt
118
J Stalin
February 11, 1945
11 fi

New York Times. February 13, 19;
t5.
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